{"id":119315,"date":"2025-02-20T17:05:58","date_gmt":"2025-02-20T15:05:58","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/?p=119315"},"modified":"2025-02-20T09:28:51","modified_gmt":"2025-02-20T07:28:51","slug":"20-05-111","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/?p=119315","title":{"rendered":"The Obama Doctrine"},"content":{"rendered":"<h5 style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/accounts.theatlantic.com\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"center alignleft\" src=\"http:\/\/www.reunion68.com\/Biuletyn\/img\/atlantic1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"35%\" \/><\/a><span style=\"text-decoration: underline; color: #000080;\"><strong><a style=\"color: #000080; text-decoration: underline;\" href=\"https:\/\/accounts.theatlantic.com\/products\/?source=nudge1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">The Obama Doctrine<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>Jeffrey Goldberg<br \/>\n<\/strong><em><span style=\"color: #808080;\">[April 2016]<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<hr style=\"height: 15px; background: #d0e6fa; width: 100%;\" \/>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/T96-IRCayhjSyz75FppCrI67YOo=\/0x375:7200x4425\/1920x1080\/media\/img\/2016\/03\/01\/WEL_Goldberg_Obama_OPENER\/original.jpg\" width=\"100%\" \/><span style=\"color: #808080;\"><em>Ruven Afanador<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<ol type=\"1\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/magazine\/archive\/2016\/04\/the-obama-doctrine\/471525\/#3\"><strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><span style=\"color: #000080; text-decoration: underline;\">Why Ukraine will always be vulnerable to Russian domination<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW ArticleParagraph_dropcap__uIVzg\" style=\"text-align: left;\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\" data-flatplan-dropcap=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><span class=\"smallcaps\">Russia\u2019s invasion of <\/span><span class=\"smallcaps\">Crimea<\/span>\u00a0in early 2014, and its decision to use force to buttress the rule of its client Bashar al-Assad, have been cited by Obama\u2019s critics as proof that the post-red-line world no longer fears America.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" style=\"text-align: left;\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">So when I talked with the president in the Oval Office in late January, I again raised this question of deterrent credibility. \u201cThe argument is made,\u201d I said, \u201cthat Vladimir Putin watched you in Syria and thought,\u00a0<i>He\u2019s too logical, he\u2019s too rational, he\u2019s too into retrenchment. I\u2019m going to push him a little bit further in<strong> <span style=\"color: #800000;\">Ukraine<\/span><\/strong><\/i>.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" style=\"text-align: left;\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama didn\u2019t much like my line of inquiry. \u201cLook, this theory is so easily disposed of that I\u2019m always puzzled by how people make the argument. I don\u2019t think anybody thought that George W. Bush was overly rational or cautious in his use of military force. And as I recall, because apparently nobody in this town does, Putin went into Georgia on Bush\u2019s watch, right smack dab in the middle of us having over 100,000 troops deployed in Iraq.\u201d Obama was referring to <strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">Putin\u2019s 2008 invasion of Georgia, a former Soviet republic, which was undertaken for many of the same reasons Putin later invaded Ukraine\u2014to keep an ex\u2013Soviet republic in Russia\u2019s sphere of influence.<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cPutin acted in <strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">Ukraine<\/span><\/strong> in response to a client state that was about to slip out of his grasp. And he improvised in a way to hang on to his control there,\u201d he said. \u201cHe\u2019s done the exact same thing in Syria, at enormous cost to the well-being of his own country. And the notion that somehow Russia is in a stronger position now, in Syria or in <strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">Ukraine<\/span><\/strong>, than they were before they invaded <strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">Ukraine<\/span><\/strong> or before he had to deploy military forces to Syria is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of power in foreign affairs or in the world generally. Real power means you can get what you want without having to exert violence. Russia was much more powerful when Ukraine looked like an independent country but was a kleptocracy that he could pull the strings on.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"3\" class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><strong><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama\u2019s theory here is simple: <span style=\"color: #800000;\">Ukraine is a core Russian interest but not an American one, so Russia will always be able to maintain escalatory dominance there.<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cThe fact is that <strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">Ukraine<\/span><\/strong>, which is a non-<span class=\"smallcaps\">nato<\/span>\u00a0country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do,\u201d he said.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">I asked Obama whether his position on<strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\"> Ukraine<\/span><\/strong> was realistic or fatalistic.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cIt\u2019s realistic,\u201d he said. \u201cBut this is an example of where we have to be very clear about what our core interests are and what we are willing to go to war for. And at the end of the day, there\u2019s always going to be some ambiguity.\u201d He then offered up a critique he had heard directed against him, in order to knock it down. \u201cI think that the best argument you can make on the side of those who are critics of my foreign policy is that the president doesn\u2019t exploit ambiguity enough. He doesn\u2019t maybe react in ways that might cause people to think,\u00a0<i>Wow, this guy might be a little crazy<\/i>.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cThe \u2018crazy Nixon\u2019 approach,\u201d I said: Confuse and frighten your enemies by making them think you\u2019re capable of committing irrational acts.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cBut let\u2019s examine the Nixon theory,\u201d he said. \u201cSo we dropped more ordnance on Cambodia and Laos than on Europe in World War II, and yet, ultimately, Nixon withdrew, Kissinger went to Paris, and all we left behind was chaos, slaughter, and authoritarian governments that finally, over time, have emerged from that hell. When I go to visit those countries, I\u2019m going to be trying to figure out how we can, today, help them remove bombs that are still blowing off the legs of little kids. In what way did that strategy promote our interests?\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">But what if Putin were threatening to move against, say, Moldova\u2014another vulnerable post-Soviet state? Wouldn\u2019t it be helpful for Putin to believe that Obama might get angry and irrational about that?<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cThere is no evidence in modern American foreign policy that that\u2019s how people respond. People respond based on what their imperatives are, and if it\u2019s really important to somebody, and it\u2019s not that important to us, they know that, and we know that,\u201d he said. \u201cThere are ways to deter, but it requires you to be very clear ahead of time about what is worth going to war for and what is not. Now, if there is somebody in this town that would claim that we would consider going to war with Russia over Crimea and eastern <strong><span style=\"color: #800000;\">Ukraine<\/span><\/strong>, they should speak up and be very clear about it. The idea that talking tough or engaging in some military action that is tangential to that particular area is somehow going to influence the decision making of Russia or China is contrary to all the evidence we have seen over the last 50 years.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama went on to say that the belief in the possibilities of projected toughness is rooted in \u201cmythologies\u201d about Ronald Reagan\u2019s foreign policy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cIf you think about, let\u2019s say, the Iran hostage crisis, there is a narrative that has been promoted today by some of the Republican candidates that the day Reagan was elected, because he looked tough, the Iranians decided, \u2018We better turn over these hostages,\u2019\u2009\u201d he said. \u201cIn fact what had happened was that there was a long negotiation with the Iranians and because they so disliked Carter\u2014even though the negotiations had been completed\u2014they held those hostages until the day Reagan got elected. Reagan\u2019s posture, his rhetoric, etc., had nothing to do with their release. When you think of the military actions that Reagan took, you have Grenada\u2014which is hard to argue helped our ability to shape world events, although it was good politics for him back home. You have the Iran-Contra affair, in which we supported right-wing paramilitaries and did nothing to enhance our image in Central America, and it wasn\u2019t successful at all.\u201d He reminded me that Reagan\u2019s great foe, Daniel Ortega, is today the unrepentant president of Nicaragua.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama also cited Reagan\u2019s decision to almost immediately pull U.S. forces from Lebanon after 241 servicemen were killed in a Hezbollah attack in 1983. \u201cApparently all these things really helped us gain credibility with the Russians and the Chinese,\u201d because \u201cthat\u2019s the narrative that is told,\u201d he said sarcastically. \u201cNow, I actually think that Ronald Reagan had a great success in foreign policy, which was to recognize the opportunity that Gorbachev presented and to engage in extensive diplomacy\u2014which was roundly criticized by some of the same people who now use Ronald Reagan to promote the notion that we should go around bombing people.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW ArticleParagraph_dropcap__uIVzg\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\" data-flatplan-dropcap=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><span class=\"smallcaps\">In a conversation\u00a0<\/span>at the end of January, I asked the president to describe for me the threats he worries about most as he prepares, in the coming months, to hand off power to his successor.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cAs I survey the next 20 years, climate change worries me profoundly because of the effects that it has on all the other problems that we face,\u201d he said. \u201cIf you start seeing more severe drought; more significant famine; more displacement from the Indian subcontinent and coastal regions in Africa and Asia; the continuing problems of scarcity, refugees, poverty, disease\u2014this makes every other problem we\u2019ve got worse. That\u2019s above and beyond just the existential issues of a planet that starts getting into a bad feedback loop.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Terrorism, he said, is also a long-term problem \u201cwhen combined with the problem of failed states.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">What country does he consider the greatest challenge to America in the coming decades? \u201cIn terms of traditional great-state relations, I do believe that the relationship between the United States and China is going to be the most critical,\u201d he said. \u201cIf we get that right and China continues on a peaceful rise, then we have a partner that is growing in capability and sharing with us the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an international order. If China fails; if it is not able to maintain a trajectory that satisfies its population and has to resort to nationalism as an organizing principle; if it feels so overwhelmed that it never takes on the responsibilities of a country its size in maintaining the international order; if it views the world only in terms of regional spheres of influence\u2014then not only do we see the potential for conflict with China, but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with these other challenges that are going to come.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Many people, I noted, want the president to be more forceful in confronting China, especially in the South China Sea. Hillary Clinton, for one, has been heard to say in private settings, \u201cI don\u2019t want my grandchildren to live in a world dominated by the Chinese.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cI\u2019ve been very explicit in saying that we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China,\u201d Obama said. \u201cI think we have to be firm where China\u2019s actions are undermining international interests, and if you look at how we\u2019ve operated in the South China Sea, we have been able to mobilize most of Asia to isolate China in ways that have surprised China, frankly, and have very much served our interest in strengthening our alliances.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">A weak, flailing Russia constitutes a threat as well, though not quite a top-tier threat. \u201cUnlike China, they have demographic problems, economic structural problems, that would require not only vision but a generation to overcome,\u201d Obama said. \u201cThe path that Putin is taking is not going to help them overcome those challenges. But in that environment, the temptation to project military force to show greatness is strong, and that\u2019s what Putin\u2019s inclination is. So I don\u2019t underestimate the dangers there.\u201d\u2029Obama returned to a point he had made repeatedly to me, one that he hopes the country, and the next president, absorbs: \u201cYou know, the notion that diplomacy and technocrats and bureaucrats somehow are helping to keep America safe and secure, most people think,\u00a0<i>Eh, that\u2019s nonsense<\/i>. But it\u2019s true. And by the way, it\u2019s the element of American power that the rest of the world appreciates unambiguously. When we deploy troops, there\u2019s always a sense on the part of other countries that, even where necessary, sovereignty is being violated.\u201d<a id=\"4\" style=\"color: #000080;\" data-event-element=\"inline link\"><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW ArticleParagraph_dropcap__uIVzg\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\" data-flatplan-dropcap=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><span class=\"smallcaps\">Over the past year<\/span>, John Kerry has visited the White House regularly to ask Obama to violate Syria\u2019s sovereignty. On several occasions, Kerry has asked Obama to launch missiles at specific regime targets, under cover of night, to \u201csend a message\u201d to the regime. The goal, Kerry has said, is not to overthrow Assad but to encourage him, and Iran and Russia, to negotiate peace. When the Assad alliance has had the upper hand on the battlefield, as it has these past several months, it has shown no inclination to take seriously Kerry\u2019s entreaties to negotiate in good faith. A few cruise missiles, Kerry has argued, might concentrate the attention of Assad and his backers. \u201cKerry\u2019s looking like a chump with the Russians, because he has no leverage,\u201d a senior administration official told me.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">The U.S. wouldn\u2019t have to claim credit for the attacks, Kerry has told Obama\u2014but Assad would surely know the missiles\u2019 return address.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama has steadfastly resisted Kerry\u2019s requests, and seems to have grown impatient with his lobbying. Recently, when Kerry handed Obama a written outline of new steps to bring more pressure to bear on Assad, Obama said, \u201cOh, another proposal?\u201d Administration officials have told me that Vice President Biden, too, has become frustrated with Kerry\u2019s demands for action. He has said privately to the secretary of state, \u201cJohn, remember Vietnam? Remember how that started?\u201d At a National Security Council meeting held at the Pentagon in December, Obama announced that no one except the secretary of defense should bring him proposals for military action. Pentagon officials understood Obama\u2019s announcement to be a brushback pitch directed at Kerry.<\/span><\/p>\n<aside class=\"ArticlePullquote_root__z11cW\" data-flatplan-pullquote=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama has bet that the price of direct U.S. action in Syria would be higher than the price of inaction.<\/span><\/aside>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">One day in January, in Kerry\u2019s office at the State Department, I expressed the obvious: He has more of a bias toward action than the president does.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cI do, probably,\u201d Kerry acknowledged. \u201cLook, the final say on these things is in his hands \u2026 I\u2019d say that I think we\u2019ve had a very symbiotic, synergistic, whatever you call it, relationship, which works very effectively. Because I\u2019ll come in with the bias toward \u2018Let\u2019s try to do this, let\u2019s try to do that, let\u2019s get this done.\u2019\u2009\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama\u2019s caution on Syria has vexed those in the administration who have seen opportunities, at different moments over the past four years, to tilt the battlefield against Assad. Some thought that Putin\u2019s decision to fight on behalf of Assad would prompt Obama to intensify American efforts to help anti-regime rebels. But Obama, at least as of this writing, would not be moved, in part because he believed that it was not his business to stop Russia from making what he thought was a terrible mistake. \u201cThey are overextended. They\u2019re bleeding,\u201d he told me. \u201cAnd their economy has contracted for three years in a row, drastically.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">In recent National Security Council meetings, Obama\u2019s strategy was occasionally referred to as the \u201cTom Sawyer approach.\u201d Obama\u2019s view was that if Putin wanted to expend his regime\u2019s resources by painting the fence in Syria, the U.S. should let him. By late winter, though, when it appeared that Russia was making advances in its campaign to solidify Assad\u2019s rule, the White House began discussing ways to deepen support for the rebels, though the president\u2019s ambivalence about more-extensive engagement remained. In conversations I had with National Security Council officials over the past couple of months, I sensed a foreboding that an event\u2014another San Bernardino\u2013style attack, for instance\u2014would compel the United States to take new and direct action in Syria. For Obama, this would be a nightmare.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">If there had been no Iraq, no Afghanistan, and no Libya, Obama told me, he might be more apt to take risks in Syria. \u201cA president does not make decisions in a vacuum. He does not have a blank slate. Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, would recognize that after over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day requiring great amounts of resources and attention in Afghanistan, with the experience of Iraq, with the strains that it\u2019s placed on our military\u2014any thoughtful president would hesitate about making a renewed commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Are you too cautious?, I asked.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cNo,\u201d he said. \u201cDo I think that had we not invaded Iraq and were we not still involved in sending billions of dollars and a number of military trainers and advisers into Afghanistan, would I potentially have thought about taking on some additional risk to help try to shape the Syria situation? I don\u2019t know.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">What has struck me is that, even as his secretary of state warns about a dire, Syria-fueled European apocalypse, Obama has not recategorized the country\u2019s civil war as a top-tier security threat.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama\u2019s hesitation to join the battle for Syria is held out as proof by his critics that he is too naive; his decision in 2013 not to fire missiles is proof, they argue, that he is a bluffer.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">This critique frustrates the president. \u201cNobody remembers bin Laden anymore,\u201d he says. \u201cNobody talks about me ordering 30,000 more troops into Afghanistan.\u201d The red-line crisis, he said, \u201cis the point of the inverted pyramid upon which all other theories rest.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">One afternoon in late January, as I was leaving the Oval Office, I mentioned to Obama a moment from an interview in 2012 when he told me that he would not allow Iran to gain possession of a nuclear weapon. \u201cYou said, \u2018I\u2019m the president of the United States, I don\u2019t bluff.\u2019\u2009\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">He said, \u201cI don\u2019t.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Shortly after that interview four years ago, Ehud Barak, who was then the defense minister of Israel, asked me whether I thought Obama\u2019s no-bluff promise was itself a bluff. I answered that I found it difficult to imagine that the leader of the United States would bluff about something so consequential. But Barak\u2019s question had stayed with me. So as I stood in the doorway with the president, I asked: \u201cWas it a bluff?\u201d I told him that few people now believe he actually would have attacked Iran to keep it from getting a nuclear weapon.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cThat\u2019s interesting,\u201d he said, noncommittally.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">I started to talk: \u201cDo you\u2014\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">He interrupted. \u201cI actually would have,\u201d he said, meaning that he would have struck Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities. \u201cIf I saw them break out.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">He added, \u201cNow, the argument that can\u2019t be resolved, because it\u2019s entirely situational, was what constitutes them getting\u201d the bomb. \u201cThis was the argument I was having with Bibi Netanyahu.\u201d Netanyahu wanted Obama to prevent Iran from being capable of building a bomb, not merely from possessing a bomb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cYou were right to believe it,\u201d the president said. And then he made his key point. \u201cThis was in the category of an American interest.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">I was reminded then of something Derek Chollet, a former National Security Council official, told me: \u201cObama is a gambler, not a bluffer.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\">\n<div class=\"ArticleInlineFigure_root__hYQJP ArticleInlineFigure_alignCenter___XmHe\" style=\"text-align: center;\" data-flatplan-inline_image=\"true\">\n<figure class=\"ArticleInlineFigure_figure__qmYhH\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><picture class=\"ArticleInlineImagePicture_picture__SVXJ7 ArticleInlineImagePicture_loaded__EFdMd\"><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"Image_root__XxsOp Image_lazy__hYWHV Image_loaded__zmzJ7 ArticleInlineImagePicture_image__I79fR aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/k3NnDnoa4jMw9GUYnzrDNbUVs7E=\/630x834\/media\/img\/posts\/2016\/03\/20160126_ATLANTIC_WASHINGTON_S01_020\/original.jpg\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/k3NnDnoa4jMw9GUYnzrDNbUVs7E=\/630x834\/media\/img\/posts\/2016\/03\/20160126_ATLANTIC_WASHINGTON_S01_020\/original.jpg, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/Ht25PPogp7vZtl6B-F9xnBO6-S8=\/1260x1668\/media\/img\/posts\/2016\/03\/20160126_ATLANTIC_WASHINGTON_S01_020\/original.jpg 2x\" alt=\"\" width=\"630\" height=\"834\" \/><\/picture><\/span><figcaption class=\"ArticleInlineFigure_figcaption__kxSCW ArticleInlineFigure_credit__Y8jgs ArticleInlineFigure_alignCenter___XmHe\"><em><span style=\"color: #808080;\">Ruven Afanador<\/span><\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">The president has placed some huge bets. Last May, as he was trying to move the Iran nuclear deal through Congress, I told him that the agreement was making me nervous. His response was telling. \u201cLook, 20 years from now, I\u2019m still going to be around, God willing. If Iran has a nuclear weapon, it\u2019s my name on this,\u201d he said. \u201cI think it\u2019s fair to say that in addition to our profound national-security interests, I have a personal interest in locking this down.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">In the matter of the Syrian regime and its Iranian and Russian sponsors, Obama has bet, and seems prepared to continue betting, that the price of direct U.S. action would be higher than the price of inaction. And he is sanguine enough to live with the perilous ambiguities of his decisions. Though in his Nobel Peace Prize speech in 2009, Obama said, \u201cInaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later,\u201d today the opinions of humanitarian interventionists do not seem to move him, at least not publicly. He undoubtedly knows that a next-generation Samantha Power will write critically of his unwillingness to do more to prevent the continuing slaughter in Syria. (For that matter, Samantha Power will also be the subject of criticism from the next Samantha Power.) As he comes to the end of his presidency, Obama believes he has done his country a large favor by keeping it out of the maelstrom\u2014and he believes, I suspect, that historians will one day judge him wise for having done so.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Inside the West Wing, officials say that Obama, as a president who inherited a financial crisis and two active wars from his predecessor, is keen to leave \u201ca clean barn\u201d to whoever succeeds him. This is why the fight against\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">isis<\/span>, a group he considers to be a direct, though not existential, threat to the U.S., is his most urgent priority for the remainder of his presidency; killing the so-called caliph of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is one of the top goals of the American national-security apparatus in Obama\u2019s last year.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Of course,\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">isis<\/span>\u00a0was midwifed into existence, in part, by the Assad regime. Yet by Obama\u2019s stringent standards, Assad\u2019s continued rule for the moment still doesn\u2019t rise to the level of direct challenge to America\u2019s national security.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">This is what is so controversial about the president\u2019s approach, and what will be controversial for years to come\u2014the standard he has used to define what, exactly, constitutes a direct threat.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">Obama has come to a number of dovetailing conclusions about the world, and about America\u2019s role in it. The first is that the Middle East is no longer terribly important to American interests. The second is that even if the Middle East were surpassingly important, there would still be little an American president could do to make it a better place. The third is that the innate American desire to fix the sorts of problems that manifest themselves most drastically in the Middle East inevitably leads to warfare, to the deaths of U.S. soldiers, and to the eventual hemorrhaging of U.S. credibility and power. The fourth is that the world cannot afford to see the diminishment of U.S. power. Just as the leaders of several American allies have found Obama\u2019s leadership inadequate to the tasks before him, he himself has found world leadership wanting: global partners who often lack the vision and the will to spend political capital in pursuit of broad, progressive goals, and adversaries who are not, in his mind, as rational as he is. Obama believes that history has sides, and that America\u2019s adversaries\u2014and some of its putative allies\u2014have situated themselves on the wrong one, a place where tribalism, fundamentalism, sectarianism, and militarism still flourish. What they don\u2019t understand is that history is bending in his direction.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">\u201cThe central argument is that by keeping America from immersing itself in the crises of the Middle East, the foreign-policy establishment believes that the president is precipitating our decline,\u201d Ben Rhodes told me. \u201cBut the president himself takes the opposite view, which is that overextension in the Middle East will ultimately harm our economy, harm our ability to look for other opportunities and to deal with other challenges, and, most important, endanger the lives of American service members for reasons that are not in the direct American national-security interest.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">If you are a supporter of the president, his strategy makes eminent sense: Double down in those parts of the world where success is plausible, and limit America\u2019s exposure to the rest. His critics believe, however, that problems like those presented by the Middle East don\u2019t solve themselves\u2014that, without American intervention, they metastasize.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">At the moment, Syria, where history appears to be bending toward greater chaos, poses the most direct challenge to the president\u2019s worldview.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ArticleParagraph_root__4mszW\" data-flatplan-paragraph=\"true\"><span style=\"color: #000080;\">George W. Bush was also a gambler, not a bluffer. He will be remembered harshly for the things he did in the Middle East. Barack Obama is gambling that he will be judged well for the things he didn\u2019t do.<\/span><\/p>\n<hr style=\"height: 15px; background: #d0e6fa; width: 100%;\" \/>\n<div id=\"content\" class=\"content-alignment\">\n<div id=\"watch-description\" class=\"yt-uix-button-panel\">\n<div id=\"watch-description-text\" style=\"text-align: center;\">\n<p><em>Zawarto\u015b\u0107 publikowanych artyku\u0142\u00f3w i materia\u0142\u00f3w nie reprezentuje pogl\u0105d\u00f3w ani opinii Reunion&#8217;68,<\/em><em><br \/>\nani te\u017c webmastera Blogu Reunion&#8217;68, chyba ze jest to wyra\u017anie zaznaczone.<br \/>\nTwoje uwagi, linki, w\u0142asne artyku\u0142y lub wiadomo\u015bci prze\u015blij na adres:<br \/>\n<\/em><span style=\"color: #000080;\"><strong><em><a style=\"color: #000080;\" href=\"mailto:webmaster@reunion68.com\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">webmaster@reunion68.com<\/span><\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<hr style=\"width: 100%;\" \/>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Obama Doctrine Jeffrey Goldberg [April 2016] Ruven Afanador Why Ukraine will always be vulnerable to Russian domination Russia\u2019s invasion of Crimea\u00a0in early 2014, and its decision to use force to buttress the rule of its client Bashar al-Assad, have been cited by Obama\u2019s critics as proof that the post-red-line world no longer fears America. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[6],"tags":[26,24],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/119315"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=119315"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/119315\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":119382,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/119315\/revisions\/119382"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=119315"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=119315"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=119315"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}