{"id":69593,"date":"2019-04-24T17:05:58","date_gmt":"2019-04-24T15:05:58","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/?p=69593"},"modified":"2019-04-24T07:14:23","modified_gmt":"2019-04-24T05:14:23","slug":"30-00-34","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/?p=69593","title":{"rendered":"\u2018The deal for the submarines was clean\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"\"<\/a>\u2018The deal for the submarines was clean\u2019<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/h5>\n

Ariel Kahana<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Former acting head of the National Security Council Jacob Nagel, who was involved in the process of acquiring the submarines at the center of Case 3,000, tells Israel Hayom that to the best of his understanding, there were no irregularities.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Former acting head of the National Security Council Jacob Nagel – no one ever thought Israel would maintain a fleet of nine submarines | Photo: Gideon Markowicz<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

On the home screen of former head of the National Security Council Jacob Nagel, between photos of him shaking hands with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Bill Clinton, there is a picture of his vital meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. It took place in Berlin in February 2016. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as usual, headed the Israeli delegation. Nagel, who only a few weeks earlier had taken up the post of acting National Security Council head, joined him.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the months leading up to that meeting, there were discussions in Israel and Germany about the possibility of signing a memorandum of understanding with the German government. The document was supposed to define what kind of naval vessels Israel would purchase from Germany over the next few years. Nagel and Netanyahu, who had studied the matter ahead of the meeting with Merkel, provided a clear answer. Nagel told his German counterpart, head of national security Christoph Hausmann, that Israel would not be acquiring anti-submarine ships. Netanyahu updated Merkel that Israel did intend to acquire three new submarines.<\/span><\/p>\n

That agreement would eventually turn into the \u201csubmarines affair,\u201d which is the focus of Case 3,000. But Nagel, who saw for himself how things played out, does not believe the claims being made against Netanyahu.<\/span><\/p>\n

In an interview to the Israel Hayom weekend magazine, Nagel says that \u201cto the best of my professional understanding, the process of acquiring [Israel\u2019s] seventh, eighth, and ninth submarines \u2013 from the moment I learned of it in October 2015 \u2013 was one of the cleanest, most orderly acquisitions there has ever been.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018We need a Palestinian Sadat\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nagel, 62, lives in Rosh Ha\u2019ayin. He is married and a father of four, a grandfather of five, and a brigadier-general in the reserves. He started his defense and security career on a special track out of high school with the 8200 intelligence unit. After 17 years there, he transferred to the Mafaat \u2013 the Defense Ministry\u2019s Research and Development Agency \u2013 where he served in a number of roles until he joined the National Security Council in 2011. He made his mark with the Nagel Commission (\u201cthere were a lot of Nagel Committees, but I\u2019m proudest of that one,\u201d he says), which recommended that Israel develop the Iron Dome missile defense system. Then, too, he and his partners \u2013 Mafaat head Shmuel Keren and Director-General of the Defense Ministry Pinchas Bucharis \u2013 felt the pressure the system knows how to exert when it opposes the political echelon\u2019s instructions about acquisitions or developments.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cWe were the target of insane attacks,\u201d Nagel said in an interview two years ago.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nagel stepped in to head the NSC after his predecessor Yossi Cohen was appointed head of the Mossad. The appointment of Avriel Bar Yosef, who had been selected to replace Cohen, was cancelled when he came under suspicion of criminal activity. Later on, those suspicions were linked to the submarines affair. Netanyahu was satisfied with Nagel\u2019s performance and asked him several times to take on the job permanently, but Nagel declined for personal reasons.<\/span><\/p>\n

In effect, Nagel was head of the NSC and national security advisor from January 2016 to April 2017. He led the talks on the U.S. aid package to Israel for the decade to come (and was even the Israeli signatory to it); the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey; and several issues that lay at the core of diplomatic-security activity. Since leaving the post, he has been a guest lecturer at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, where he lectures on policy and strategy in research and development and directs the Center for Defense Information and Technology. Here and there, he talks to the media about what he knows about the submarines affair, but after several instances in which his comments were twisted, decided to keep quiet until the election was over. Now that his version of events cannot be accused of being used to influence voters, he is ready to speak.<\/span><\/p>\n

This week, Israel Hayom revealed elements of an article on Netanyahu\u2019s defense outlook<\/strong><\/a> Nagel is writing for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThey always say things here are a mess. So here, for the first time since [Israel\u2019s first Prime Minister David] Ben-Gurion, a prime minister who apparently intends to remain in office for several years to come, says \u2018This is what you should aim for.\u2019 A defense outlook affects force-building in the IDF 20 or 30 years down the road. A big part of the outlook document is classified, and it includes instructions that cannot be revealed,\u201d he says.<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: Did Netanyahu write his defense outlook by himself?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cHe wrote it along with the military leadership, the NSC, and his closest associates. The document was presented in sub rosa forums in the defense establishment and the Knesset. People close to Netanyahu, like the former head of the NSC, read it and gave him notes.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: What are the main differences between Netanyahu\u2019s defense outlook and Ben-Gurion\u2019s?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cBen-Gurion, for example, decided that we had to be ready for an outbreak of violence against us every few years, which is indeed what happened. Netanyahu says that we need to be ready for an ongoing war. Secondly, today we need to be prepared for all kinds of enemies. Nations, demi-nations, political terror organizations like the International Criminal Court in The Hague and BDS. Netanyahu also added the need to defend Jewish communities worldwide. These are things that didn\u2019t exist in Ben-Gurion\u2019s time.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: If there is constant war, doesn\u2019t that mean that the security situation has gotten worse?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cNot at all. Overall, in terms of security, Israel\u2019s situation is very good, and has maybe never been better. The glass is a lot more full than empty.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: Many people are disappointed that the IDF has not defeated Hamas. What are we missing?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe Gaza Strip is a problem for which I don\u2019t currently see a solution. The biggest concessions we would make don\u2019t meet their minimum demands, so there\u2019s no one to talk to, or anything to talk about. Will we occupy Gaza? Will we beat Hamas? I\u2019m in favor of it, but what will we do then? Who will replace them?\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Nagel says that the only solution is for a figure like former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to arise, who would change the Palestinians\u2019 thinking.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThey used to think that [Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud] Abbas would be someone like that, but he isn\u2019t doing the job \u2013 not in Gaza and not in Judea and Samaria. They need someone from inside.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2018Get China out of Haifa Port\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: You were in the NSC for six years. For years, it was the poor cousin of the defense establishment. Is it now doing its job as the prime minister\u2019s diplomatic-security brain?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe NSC serves as the prime minister\u2019s right hand in all areas of security and diplomacy. The head of the NSC prepares every diplomatic conversation the prime minister holds with world leaders, and is on the line while it takes place. There are situations in which the talks would get into politics, and then I, for example, would get off the line or stop listening.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe NSC is not meant to supplant the Defense Ministry, and it doesn\u2019t. The NSC looks at the macro, makes observations, and presents alternatives. The way I see it, the strength of the NSC is tested by how far the NSC head sits from the prime minister. Today, a single office \u2013 the chief of staff\u2019s \u2013 separates us, and the military secretary sits across from us. These are the people closest to the prime minister, and that\u2019s how it should be.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: For quite some time, there has been talk of the Chinese investing in sensitive fields in Israel. This week, the issue was raised in discussions your successor, Meir Ben Shabbat, held in Washington. What is your opinion?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cOf course, I don\u2019t know what was discussed by my excellent successor at the NSC. It\u2019s important to me to make it clear that I have no problem with China or with any other country that wants to invest in Israel, but we need to demarcate what is open to them and what is not. As head of the NSC, I discovered to my amazement that problematic deals could go through without the NSC or the Defense Ministry being aware of them or expressing an opinion. Today, the situation is that if we want to sell something security-related, we need approval from the Defense Ministry. In other words, there is oversight. On the other hand, when it comes to civilian products, anyone can do what they want. The Tel Aviv light rail, Phoenix insurance, Bank Leumi or a port \u2013 every ministry decides based on its own considerations. That\u2019s not plausible.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cWhen we\u2019re talking about vital national infrastructures, or harm to our close allies, there needs to be oversight \u2013 and it doesn\u2019t matter if the country is China, Japan, or anyone else. Everyone knows about the cyber threat. Imagine a state of emergency in which a foreign country has control of our traffic lights.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: Should we cancel the construction of the new Haifa Port by a Chinese firm?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cIn my opinion, we should consider a change, or even a cancellation, of that plan, if it\u2019s possible.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

The submarines affair, in five acts<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: Many people, including former Defense Minister Moshe Ya\u2019alon, say that Netanyahu and his people wanted to purchase the submarines and other vessels to line their own pockets, and what Netanyahu did approaches treason. What is your response?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cI don\u2019t intend to address remarks by officials I greatly respect, some of whom were my commanders and even gave me my stripes. I can only lay out the facts as I know them, and it could be that I don\u2019t know everything. I can say that at no stage was there any intention for Israel to be in possession of nine submarines simultaneously. That was never an option, and anyone who says differently is either making things up or doesn\u2019t know the facts.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: So what did happen?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cWhen people talk about the naval vessels, there are essentially five different stories, some of which have nothing to do with each other. The first story is the sixth submarine. There was an argument for years about whether Israel needed five or six submarines. The defense establishment said five were enough; the political echelon, which by the way included former Defense Minister Ehud Barak, decided back in 2010 that six were necessary. The political echelon has the full authority to force its opinion on the matter to be accepted, as happened with many battles over weaponry, such as Iron Dome, satellite development, and other things.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cEvery submarine has an \u2018expiration date,\u2019 which is determined the day it is launched and after which it cannot be used. Secondly, 10 to 12 years pass from the moment the contract to purchase a submarine is signed until it arrives in Israel. In other words, theoretically, a replacement for a submarine that is decommissioned in 2027 should have been ordered in 2015, so we were behind schedule for some of the submarines. Practically speaking, when it comes to submarines, there is no country other than Germany to buy them from, and in Germany, you buy from ThyssenKrupp.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: What is the second story?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe second story, which I know from NSC documents, is about the patrol boats to defend the natural gas rigs. There is not and never was any dispute about the need for those boats. There was a question about whom to buy them from, because unlike submarines, there are alternatives.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: Ya\u2019alon contends that the prime minister stopped an international tender for the patrol boats put out by the Defense Ministry. He sees it as more proof of corrupt conspiracy.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cI don\u2019t respond to things someone says. This is a lengthy process that took several years. The Defense Ministry put out a tender for the boats, and did so against the instructions of head of the NSC at the time, Yossi Cohen. The tender was published in the morning, and the written orders not to put out a tender apparently arrived that afternoon.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: If there are alternatives to the German patrol boats, why not publish a tender?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe entire time, Israel was making attempts to get Germany to give it a discount on the boats. The Germans dragged their feet and tried to link the discount to the Palestinian issue. At one stage, the Defense Ministry thought they couldn\u2019t wait any longer and decided to put out an international tender. But then the prime minister spoke with Merkel by phone, and he convinced her to give Israel the discount. By the way, the finance minister at the time, Yair Lapid, and the defense minister at the time, Avigdor Lieberman, were both involved in these negotiations. The Defense Ministry still wanted to see the Germans put in writing their willingness to give us the discount, so they put out a tender. The NSC, as I said, opposed it, and the tender was stopped.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

On the matter of the patrol boats, there is no dispute between Nagel and Ya\u2019alon about the facts. They agree that the tender was issued and then canceled, and in the end the Germans gave Israel the discount. The dispute has to do with the reason for the cancellation. Nagel explains that the discount and the importance of maintaining ties with Germany prompted Netanyahu to stop the tender; Ya\u2019alon claims that the decision was motivated by financial interests.<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: But what about the anti-submarine warships? According to Ya\u2019alon, no one wanted them and there was no need for them.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThat\u2019s not accurate. The anti-sub warships apparently have to do with the third scandal, which is the sale of the German submarines to Egypt. Despite countless reports and comments, the Germans did not need Israel\u2019s approval to sell submarines to the Egyptians. In contrast to what people say I said, I never contradicted the prime minister on this matter. What I said was that I was not aware of any Israeli approval for the sale of German submarines to Egypt, because the Germans don\u2019t need any.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cFor years, when the Germans would ask our opinion about selling submarines to Egypt, we would object. The Germans, as a friendly nation, listened to our position, but they were under no obligation to accept it. For example, in a meeting Netanyahu held with German Foreign Minister Frannk-Walter Steinmeier in November 2014, he told him that Israel objected to the sale of submarines to Egypt, but in March 2015, when he was asked again, Netanyahu didn\u2019t object.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: What changed?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cApparently something happened that I prefer not to discuss.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: You\u2019re referring to what Netanyahu calls \u201cthe secret.\u201d Do you know what it is?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cToday I know. At the time, I didn\u2019t, because I still wasn\u2019t in the job [at the NSC]. When I took over as acting NSC head, before that meeting with<\/span> Merkel in February 2016, I became aware of the subject.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: Did the defense minister, the chief of staff, and other senior officials know?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cIn hindsight, it turned out that everyone knew. There was a process in which the Germans decided to sell submarines to Egypt, and the Defense Ministry no doubt knew about it.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: So why did the prime minister tell Channel 12 news that they didn\u2019t?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThat\u2019s not exactly what he said. Take note of his words. He said, \u2018Not everything that the prime minister does the chief of staff or defense minister has to know about.\u2019 Everyone took that sentence to mean that he had kept the defense minister and chief of staff out of the loop. But he didn\u2019t say that, and what\u2019s more, in an interview later on he said that it became clear to him that they did know.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Shouting matches between Netanyahu and Ya\u2019alon<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: Again, what about the anti-submarine boats, the ones Ya\u2019alon said \u201cno one wanted\u201d?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThat\u2019s the fourth story, and here it\u2019s possible that part of the process was not entirely in good order. But it has almost nothing to do with the prime minister. From the moment it turned out that the Egyptians were about to receive submarines, the Navy or the NSC thought it could be an opportunity to get anti-submarine warships from the Germans, cheaply. It\u2019s a reasonable thought, but apparently the proposal was not submitted to the NSC from the Defense Ministry in an orderly manner. In October 2015, the prime minister went to visit Merkel, and in the meeting the request to acquire three new submarines to replace the existing ones was brought up, as well as two anti-submarine ships. The Germans responded with a request that we prepare a document and discuss it at the next meeting.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cAhead of the next meeting with Merkel, in February 2016, and after submitting a draft of the deal with the Germans to the Defense Ministry, I updated the prime minister that the Defense Ministry objected to the anti-submarine boats. He responded by asking me, \u2018Remind me what an anti-submarine warship is?\u2019 I explained, and he said, \u2018If they don\u2019t want them, take it out of the draft document.\u2019 This shows you how minor the issue of the anti-submarine ships was. It was dropped as quickly as it came up, and that was it.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: What\u2019s the fifth story?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThe fifth story is about the seventh, eighth, and ninth submarines. Like I said, in the meeting with Merkel in October 2015, it was agreed that Israel would prepare an orderly paper on which the request would be presented. At the same time, the IDF\u2019s Gideon multi-year work plan was being assembled. The plan included general instructions from the prime minister that were passed on to the NSC and the IDF, according to which Israel should prepare to acquire three more submarines. It was clear to everyone that this meant submarines that would replace the old ones, not that we\u2019d have a total of nine.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: Ya\u2019alon says he had shouting matches with the prime minister, and he stopped the submarines deal.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cIt\u2019s true there was shouting, but nothing was stopped. Netanyahu thought that we were behind schedule and we needed to make a decision about the new submarines. The cabinet gave the green light to sign the MoU [memorandum of understanding] to purchase the submarines in October 2016, and everyone was in favor of acquiring three new submarines, including [then-IDF Chief of Staff Gadi] Eizenkot, because it was obvious the old ones had to be replaced.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: If everyone agreed that there was a need for new submarines, why did the Defense Ministry and Ya\u2019alon object?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cI think, and this is a guess, that they were afraid it would hurt the budget for the Gideon plan, so they wanted to put off the matter for a year. But everyone agreed about the need. The argument was about the timing and the final number of submarines we would have a decade on \u2013 five or six. So I say that the acquisition of the seventh, eighth, and ninth submarines was the cleanest one there has ever been.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: You know some of the suspects in the submarines affair. Do you think they did what the police suspect them of doing?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cI won\u2019t address anything that is under investigation by the police. As far as the MoU for the acquisition of the submarines, I dealt with it myself and I can say that no one intervened or tried to intervene, other than the relevant experts. David Sharan (Netanyahu\u2019s former chief of staff, who is suspected of taking bribes from Miki Ganor) was sitting in the room next to me and never said word about it. Others didn\u2019t, either. I said hi to David Shimron (a former Netanyahu advisor, who represented Ganor) in the hallway once, and beyond that I never had any contact with him. I know Sharan, [former NSC deputy director] Avriel Bar Yosef, and [former minister] Modi Zandberg, and it never occurred to me they did what they are accused of. The prime minister\u2019s decisions on the submarines and the boats were, in my opinion, correct and clear of any outside influence. I accepted those decisions.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Q: What about the possibility that Sharan and the others steered him toward making those decisions?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cThat makes no sense, and there is nothing to back it up. I\u2019ve spent many hours with the prime minister. If he says he never talked about the submarines with Sharan, I believe him, and everyone else should, too.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u2018The deal for the submarines was clean\u2019 Ariel Kahana Former acting head of the National Security Council Jacob Nagel, who was involved in the process of acquiring the submarines at the center of Case 3,000, tells Israel Hayom that to the best of his understanding, there were no irregularities. Former acting head of the National […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[6],"tags":[26,24],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69593"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=69593"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69593\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":69680,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69593\/revisions\/69680"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=69593"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=69593"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.reunion68.se\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=69593"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}