The Untold Story: IAF Attack of Syrian Nuclear Reactor

Tal Giladi

---

Declassified: On September 2007, Israel destroyed the nuclear reactor in Dier ez-Zor, Syria as part of an operation named “Silent Tone”. The attack, performed by IAF “Ra’am” (F-15I) and “Sufa” (F-16I) fighter jets, became one of the most important military operations in the IDF’s history

The IAF attacked and destroyed the Syrian nuclear reactor in Dier ez-Zor in the night between September 5th and 6th, 2007, in operation “Silent Tone” – a historic operation of great significance for the IAF, IDF, State of Israel and Jewish People.

The Syrian nuclear reactor project operated under a heavy cloak of secrecy for about six years, and was exposed by the Israeli Intelligence Community in its final stages, a few months before its completion and operation. The premise that led Israel in its decision to attack it, was that the existence of an operational nuclear reactor in Syria would significantly impact the strategic reality in the Middle East and represent a potential existential threat to the State of Israel.

The First Priority

The Directorate of Military Intelligence and Mossad’s (Israel’s National Intelligence Agency) efforts bore fruit in late March, 2007, when the suspicions regarding a covert military nuclear program in Syria was verified. The information was relayed to Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister, Amir Peretz, who instructed the IDF to prepare a number of optional aerial operation plans for the destruction of the reactor.

Two days after the verification of the intelligence, then IAF Commander, Maj. Gen. (Res’) Eliezer Shkedi, first consulted a small forum of senior commanders in order to formulate an operational plan for the destruction of the facility. The forum consisted of IAF Directorate Heads, Head of the IAF Operations Department and Military Intelligence Directorate representatives. Maj. Gen. Shkedi emphasized that the mission had become a first priority and stood above all other operations. He ordered the establishment of an operational intelligence planning team, with the mission of designing an operational plan for the attack of the Syrian reactor. By command of the Chief of IDF General Staff, the existence of the reactor was classified under the highest secrecy.

“I was in the second year of my tenure as Head of the Operations Department and the IDF was heavily debriefing the 2006 ‘Second Lebanon’ War. The intelligence was given to the IAF around March 2007, and the IAF Commander initiated a battle procedure that I was responsible for executing”, shared Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin, today the Commander of the IAF.

“We met with Head of the Operations Department on April 10, at 07:00 AM, and he told us that there was a nuclear reactor in Syria. Just like that, very concretely. The command was that we needed to be able to attack the target in one month. We had to formulate an operational command, a model validating the attack plan and an operation plan for war, if it were to break out as a result”, recalled Lt. Col. (Res’) Shay, who headed the team that planned the operation. “I remember that I was supposed to be on call in my squadron that weekend, I called the deputy squadron commander and told him that I couldn’t make it, which was very unlike me. When he asked me why, I told him it was work matters. I need to know what it is, he asked. I told him that in due time, he will know. A few years later, he told me that that was the first clue to the fact that something special was happening in the IAF”.

“One day, a meeting with the Head of Air Division, appeared in my schedule. He said to me, this is the situation; the Syrians are building a reactor and the orders are to attack it”, recalled Col. (Res’) G’, who was chosen to serves as the “Red” (aggressor) force in the planning process of the attack. “That same night I entered a small side room in Operational HQ where the planning team was working. The existence of the reactor came as a big surprise; the IAF had dealt with the Syrian theatre and with its aerial defense division to a great extent, but it didn’t plan for this”.

Hit, Critical Hit and Destruction

“In the IAF – many people knew about the aerial operation, but not about the target, and in the Military Intelligence Directorate, many people knew about the target, but not about the operation”, shared Lt. Col. (Res’) S’. The first steps he took in planning the initial operation plan, which the team was asked to present in three days’ time, was to study the IAF attacks on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985. “Inside the planning team we defined three damage criteria – hit, critical hit and destruction. We analyzed the methods to achieve each one, and the consequences for the other side, how long will it take them to recover. Every type of armament we used in the operation corresponded with a different damage criterion. When choosing the munitions, besides the result they produced, we tested their credibility and conducted risk assessment. Armament can do a good job, but if you know that there is only a 70% chance it will work, you will reconsider. There were things we tested and did not succeed, and it goes to show that we were daring and tried many options”.

read more: The Untold Story: IAF Attack of Syrian Nuclear Reactor

---

 

---