Inwazja Hamasu na Izrael 7 października 2023 r. była częścią dżihadu Hamasu w celu zniszczenia Izraela i zastąpienia go państwem islamistycznym. Dżihad nie ma na celu uwolnienia więźniów ani usunięcia osiedli i punktów kontrolnych, ale wymordowanie Żydów i unicestwienie Izraela. Iran i Hamas nie przejmują się tym, że dziesiątki tysięcy Palestyńczyków straci życie, dopóki mają pozwolenie na prowadzenie dżihadu przeciwko Izraelowi. Każde porozumienie, które utrzyma Hamas u władzy, utoruje drogę islamistycznym mordercom, gwałcicielom i zabójcom dzieci do przeprowadzenia jeszcze większej liczby masakr na Izraelczykach. Na zdjęciu: terroryści z Hamasu paradują z trumną zawierającą szczątki zamordowanego przez nich izraelskiego zakładnika przed tłumem zwolenników w Chan Junus w Strefie Gazy 20 lutego 2025 r. (Zdjęcie: Instagram)

Masakra Hamasu z 7 października jest częścią dżihadu dla zniszczenia Izraela

Khaled Abu Toameh
Tłumaczenie: Małgorzata Koraszewska

Khaled Abu Toameh – urodzony w 1963 r. w Tulkarem na Zachodnim Brzegu, arabski dziennikarz, któremu wielokrotnie grożono śmiercią. Publikował między innymi w “The Jerusalem Post”, “Wall Street Journal”, “Sunday Times”, “U.S. News”, “World Report”, “World Tribune”, “Daily Express” i palestyńskim dzienniku “Al-Fajr”. Od 1989 roku jest współpracownikiem i konsultantem NBC News.

With Trump’s backing, Hamas’s defeat is now possible

Jonathan S. Tobin

A Hamas terrorist at the funeral of Hamas council member Ghazi Abu Tamaa, in Al-Hajj Musa Mosque in Khan Yunis in Gaza, Feb. 4, 2025. Photo by Ali Hassan/Flash90.

For the last year and a half, it has been a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those who have claimed that Hamas couldn’t be defeated were right—but only because the rules of engagement of the war that the terrorists launched on Oct. 7, 2023, were set up to ensure that it survived. Those rules may now be about to change. Or at least they will if the Jewish state takes advantage of two factors that could alter the balance of power between it and the genocidal terrorists it seeks to destroy.

The change in power in Washington and the shocking exploitation of the ceasefire deal on the part of Hamas that so outraged the Israeli public has given Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu an opportunity to reset that agreement in a way that could either free all the hostages or lead to Hamas’s demise. The question is: Does he have sufficient support from his own people to do it?

That’s the context for the announcement this past weekend that Israel was halting the entry of humanitarian goods and supplies into the Gaza Strip until Hamas agrees to the framework for a second-phase deal along the lines proposed by the Trump administration. The goal is to set up a negotiation that would achieve at least one of Israel’s two main war goals: freeing all of the remaining hostages taken by the Palestinians on Oct. 7 and eradicating Hamas.

The problem with those goals is that they are mutually exclusive.

Will Hamas be allowed to win?

The only way to get all the hostages back is by assenting to an accord that will mean full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. In spite of the various plans being floated for what will happen in the Strip after fighting truly ends, that means Hamas will emerge from the war not only alive but still in control of its ruined fiefdom.

At the same time, the only way to completely defeat Hamas—something difficult but not impossible—involves a decision on the part of Jerusalem that its war effort cannot be held hostage along with the Israelis still held by the terrorists.

This is glaringly obvious, though not being acknowledged by Netanyahu or the Trump administration. Yet the aid cutoff is a sign that Israel’s government is finally starting to act as if it is not committed to fighting Hamas with one hand tied behind its back.

An incomplete victory

The Israel Defense Forces destroyed Hamas’s organized military formations, killed much of its leadership and demolished a sizeable portion of its infrastructure—both above ground and in the hundreds of miles of tunnels it had built in the coastal enclave. But when a ceasefire/hostage release deal halted the fighting in January, it was also clear that the Islamist group that had ruled Gaza as an independent Palestinian state in all but name since 2007 was far from eradicated.

The constant admonitions of the Biden administration demanding that Israel avoid civilian casualties in Gaza, even if it meant letting the terrorists escape, was one part of the problem. Those warnings couldn’t be entirely ignored because they were backed up by threats of halting the supply of vital arms shipments, as well as the slow-walking of deliveries of those shipments that were allowed to be sent to Israel.

The other was that even while it was fighting the Islamist group, in addition to its allies and collaborators, Israel was forced to do something unprecedented in the history of warfare: aiding the civilian population under the control of its enemies. Moreover, it did so while knowing that much of the food, fuel and other supplies being shipped into Gaza daily were winding up in the hands of the very same group that started the war with unspeakable atrocities on Oct. 7.

Despite being falsely accused of war crimes and even committing “genocide” in Gaza, the IDF conducted urban combat in a situation in which its foes deliberately tried to get its own people killed. They did this by fighting around and even underneath them in tunnels and bunkers under hospitals, schools, mosques and civilian homes. Even when taking into account that the casualty statistics supplied by Hamas were wild exaggerations, roughly half the number of those killed in Gaza included Hamas and combatants of other terrorist groups. More than that, when realizing that approximately 80% of fatalities were Hamas members or their families, it’s clear that the charges against the IDF were utter falsehoods.

A dangerous ceasefire

Nevertheless, the ability of Hamas to maintain its much-diminished numbers is the result of pressure exerted on Israel by a Biden administration that was primarily interested in ending the war at any cost, even if it meant that the terrorists emerged triumphant.

Just as important, the terms of the ceasefire/hostage deal that President Joe Biden’s foreign-policy team crafted with their duplicitous Qatari partners seemed to lead to that same outcome. And though President Donald Trump was opposed to Hamas’s continued existence and threatened to unleash “all Hell” on the region if all the hostages weren’t released by his inauguration on Jan. 20, his desire to have the shooting stop in time for his swearing-in led his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, to accept those same terms as he pushed the deal over the goal line in the days before Trump 2.0 took power.

That agreement did lead to the release of 30 hostages. But even as Israelis and every decent person celebrated their return home, their condition and the humiliating ceremonies that Hamas staged for their release, including a celebration when the bodies of the Bibas children were handed over, has also transformed the situation.

Netanyahu is under enormous domestic pressure to try to ransom the remaining living hostages, which may number no more than two dozen. He has also been empowered by the outrage against Hamas to not accept the same terms for a second phase of the ceasefire that would simply drag out the same process. That would further empower the terrorists and encourage them to believe they can continue to hang on amid the ruins of a war they started.

The Trump factor

The aid stoppage represents a fundamental change in the way Israel is treating an enemy that makes no secret of its desire to destroy the Jewish state and commit the genocide of its population. It puts Hamas on notice that the gloves may soon be coming off in the war unless it stops playing for time.

That has only been made possible by Trump’s victory last November.

Europe and much of the world still act as if Israel is the only country in the world not allowed to fight to win a war forced on it. But unlike Biden, Trump isn’t worried about international opinion about Gaza. Nor is he constrained to avoid whole-hearted support of the war on Hamas by a faction of his party as Biden was by the left-wing base of the Democrats, where hostility to Israel has gone mainstream. Trump wants the hostages freed, but he’s also floated a plan for not just ousting the terrorists but resettling Gazans elsewhere and turning the Strip into a resort. If Israel chooses to resume the war—the only way to make that or any other postwar plan that is predicated on a non-Hamas government there—he won’t protest or continue advocating for the fantasy of a Palestinian state as Biden did. Indeed, it’s likely that Trump will be cheering on an Israeli offensive.

The next days and weeks will be something of a game of chicken as Hamas and Israel go right up to the brink of war, with both sides daring each other to take responsibility for blowing up the ceasefire talks. The question of which of them has more to lose from such an outcome is open for debate. Netanyahu can’t let Hamas survive, but he also can’t be seen as writing off the lives of any remaining living hostages. Hamas wants to hold onto the hostages because so long as they do, they think they are safe. But they also know an Israel unfettered by American pressure could mean their doom.

Netanyahu now has far more weapons to pressure Hamas than he did before January. By having a partner in Washington who doesn’t believe that Hamas is an “idea” that can’t be defeated but a terror group that can and should be eradicated, he can finally start waging war on it in a way to accomplish that goal.

Such a decision will bring down more opprobrium on Israel than before. And it will likely further fuel the surge of antisemitism spreading across the globe from those who believe that one Jewish state on the planet is one too many. But if anything is certain, it’s that Hamas won’t give up the remaining hostages unless it retains its power and arms. And that is something neither Israel nor the Trump administration should accept.

It remains to be seen if Netanyahu can resist the pressure on him to throw away the sacrifices made by Israel’s soldiers to secure the lives of the hostages. If he does, the primary reason won’t be an American ally that doesn’t think an evil terrorist organization should be allowed to get away with mass murder.

Jonathan S. Tobin is editor-in-chief of the Jewish News Syndicate, a senior contributor for The Federalist, a columnist for Newsweek and a contributor to many other publications. He covers the American political scene, foreign policy, the U.S.-Israel relationship, Middle East diplomacy, the Jewish world and the arts. He hosts the JNS “Think Twice” podcast, both the weekly video program and the “Jonathan Tobin Daily” program, which are available on all major audio platforms and YouTube. Previously, he was executive editor, then senior online editor and chief political blogger, for Commentary magazine. Before that, he was editor-in-chief of The Jewish Exponent in Philadelphia and editor of the Connecticut Jewish Ledger. He has won more than 60 awards for commentary, art criticism and other writing. He appears regularly on television, commenting on politics and foreign policy. Born in New York City, he studied history at Columbia University.

Hezbollah Admits Fall of Assad Regime in Syria a ‘Major Strategic Loss’ for Terror Group

Ailin Vilches Arguello

Funeral ceremony for former Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, outskirts of Beirut, Feb. 23, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

Hezbollah views the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria as “a major strategic loss” that weakens its efforts against Israel, according to a co-founder of the Iran-backed Lebanese terrorist group, which continues to face mounting challenges after losing key leaders in its latest war with the Jewish state.

“There’s no doubt that the political transformation which took place in Syria was a major strategic loss — we can’t deny that,” Ali Fayyad, a long-time senior Hezbollah official who also serves as a member of the Lebanese parliament, told the Responsible Statecraft, an online magazine of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft think tank, in a new interview published on Tuesday.

Last month, Ahmed al-Sharaa became Damascus’s transitional president after leading a rebel campaign that ousted long-time Syrian leader Assad, whose Iran-backed rule had strained ties with the Arab world during the nearly 14-year Syrian war.

According to an announcement by the military command that led the offensive against Assad, Sharaa was given the authority to form a temporary legislative council for the transitional period and to suspend the country’s constitution.

The collapse of Assad’s regime was the result of an offensive spearheaded by Sharaa’s Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, a former al-Qaeda affiliate.

“Our previous ties with the [Assad] regime are linked to one specific issue related to the necessity of establishing a balance against Israel in a complicated regional struggle,” Fayyad said. “Our ties with the regime were strictly tied to these considerations.”

With the fall of the Assad regime, Shi’ite Hezbollah not only lost its main transit route for weapons deliveries from Iran via Syria but also must now contend with new leadership in Damascus aligned with the same Sunni extremist groups it once fought to support Assad.

During the interview, Fayyad explained that Hezbollah is not looking for trouble with Syria’s new leadership but rather supports Lebanon’s stance on maintaining balanced relations between the two countries. However, he also emphasized the importance of protecting minorities, respecting freedoms, and preventing the emergence of another oppressive regime in Syria.

“We are also keeping an eye on the stance of the new leadership in Syria towards Israel,” Fayyad said. “This stance is confusing and poses a lot of questions, as Israel infiltrated and occupied Syrian territory without any stance taken from the new leadership. This is something strange from every legal and political standpoint which you wouldn’t find in any other country.”

Following Assad’s fall in December, Israel moved troops into a buffer zone along the Syrian border to secure a military position to prevent terrorists from launching attacks against the Jewish state. The previously demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights was established under the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Damascus and Jerusalem that ended the Yom Kippur War.

Syria’s new government has called for Israel to withdraw its forces but has used a noticeably less hostile tone than Hezbollah or its backers in Iran when speaking about the Jewish state.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said last month that Israel would not tolerate the presence of HTS or any forces affiliated with Syria’s new rulers south of Damascus and demanded the area be demilitarized.

Also last month, Israel said it would keep troops in five locations in southern Lebanon past a Feb. 18 ceasefire deadline for their withdrawal, as Israeli leaders sought to reassure northern residents that they can return home safely.

In November, Lebanon and Israel reached a US-brokered ceasefire agreement that ended a year of fighting between the Jewish state and Hezbollah. Under the agreement, Israel was given 60 days to withdraw from Beirut’s southern border, allowing the Lebanese army and UN forces to take over security as Hezbollah disarms and moves away from Israel’s northern border.

Fayyad said that Lebanon has the right to use force, if needed, to put an end to the “Israeli occupation.”

“Hezbollah remains committed to resistance and considers that it is Lebanon’s right to confront any Israeli aggression,” he continued. “The Israelis being in five points is something which we consider to be occupation, and this gives Lebanon the right to use all possible means to liberate these occupied territories.”

Since Assad’s fall, the new Syrian government has sought to strengthen ties with Arab and Western leaders. Damascus’s new diplomatic relationships reflect a distancing from its previous allies, Iran and Russia. For example, Tehran has not reopened its embassy in Syria, which was a central part of its self-described “Axis of Resistance” against US-backed Israel, including Assad’s regime and a network of terrorist proxies — primarily Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The new Syrian government appears focused on reassuring the West and working to get sanctions lifted, which date back to 1979 when the US labeled Syria a state sponsor of terrorism and were significantly increased following Assad’s violent response to the anti-government protests.

The Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on opposition protests in 2011 sparked the Syrian civil war, during which Syria was suspended from the Arab League for more than a decade.

Referring to their relationship with Washington, Fayyad said Hezbollah has no bilateral issues with the United States but emphasized that their stance is tied to “the Palestinian cause and this alignment [with Israel] which ignores human rights and the UN laws and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.”

“The problem with the American administration is this issue first of all and second this intervention in the affairs of other societies and countries, and exercising unjust hegemony over international relations,” he added.