Unfulfilled Promise

Unfulfilled Promise

Adam Gregerman


Pope Francis and the Israel-Hamas war.

Pope Francis meets a delegation of families of Palestinians from Gaza in Vatican City, Nov. 22, 2023 /  Vatican Media via Vatican Pool/Getty Images

Pope Francis has called for an investigation to determine if Israel’s operation in Gaza constitutes genocide, according to a new book published for the Catholic Church’s jubilee year. “According to some experts, what is happening in Gaza has the characteristics of a genocide,” the pope said in excerpts published Sunday by the Italian daily La Stampa.

What makes the inflammatory statements in the pope’s book especially disturbing is that they follow on remarks by the pope that appear to demonize Jews even more broadly and which are contrary to teachings of the Church. Pope Francis’ prior Letter to Catholics of the Middle East on the first anniversary of the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel from Gaza provoked widespread confusion and consternation among Jews and Catholics. While he has spoken regularly about the attack and the fighting that erupted in its wake, his inclusion in the letter of a citation of John 8:44 to denounce the evils of war was to many inexplicable.

The verse chosen by the pontiff, a vitriolic accusation that the Jews “are from [their] father, the devil,” has for centuries provoked and been used to justify Church hostility to Jews. Yet such terrible imagery of Jewish malfeasance is thoroughly out of place in a modern Catholic document. Regrettably, the pope nonetheless chose to use this notorious verse at a time when global antisemitism has reached disturbingly high levels. Such a statement threatens the intellectual work of his Catholic predecessors going back to the 1960s.

While the citation is surely troubling, more significant is the letter itself, for it is yet another example of an ongoing presentation of Francis’ extensive and controversial views on the Israel-Hamas war. This letter has made people aware of this significant body of statements and demonstrates the compelling need to understand current relations with one of the Jewish community’s most influential and important partners, Pope Francis and the Catholic Church. In the year after the attack, Francis has spoken publicly about the war at least 75 different times. The conflict is not just like other conflicts, for it occurs in a place “which has witnessed the history of revelation” (2/2/24). Not only is he understandably very distressed about the war, but he is also clearly knowledgeable about it and notes many aspects of it (e.g., hostages, negotiations, humanitarian aid, Israeli airstrikes, challenges for aid workers). With the possible exception of Russia’s war on Ukraine, no other conflict has received such frequent mention by Francis, nor has he engaged so intimately with the specific features of other, often more deadly conflicts. He addressed the war most often in scheduled gatherings for the Sunday Angelus Prayer and in weekly audiences with the general public, though he has discussed it at greater length in official contexts (e.g., Address to Members of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See, 1/8/24).

Francis, with rare exceptions, ignores or minimizes the nature of the threats faced by Israel. Despite the avowed goals of Israel’s enemies, he never acknowledges this as distinctly genocidal in intent.

Pope Francis does not just speak homiletically. His statements express his deep-seated and passionate convictions about morality and political affairs. They also both reflect and influence current trends in Catholic thinking about the Israel-Hamas war. The Holy See of course is not just a religious institution but also a state, engaged in pragmatic exchanges and negotiations with other states and organizations. The pope’s views on war and peace necessarily shape Vatican diplomacy and guide Catholic political proposals, as seen for example in the statement of the Apostolic Nuncio to the U.N. in January 2024, which is replete with references to Francis’ speeches and elaboration on his ideas.

Francis is struggling to reconcile traditional Catholic just war theory, which began with St. Augustine centuries ago, with contemporary Catholic resistance to almost any justification of war, especially without international sanction (Fratelli Tutti 258 n. 242; see also the Catechism of the Catholic Church 2302-17). The latter, more skeptical view of war has roots in the 19th century but emerged strongly after World War II and the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), especially in the wake of the Shoah and the development of nuclear weapons. It continues to develop today, with Francis giving it his own emphases that reflect his roots in the global south and the influence of liberationist theology.

It is ironic, or perhaps predictable, that the Catholic Church in the modern period, now without access to military power, has moved away from just war theory and now largely deploys its more restrained views of war and peace in judging others. Given the prominence of the Israel-Hamas war in Francis’ speeches and its moral and political complexity, as well as his stature internationally, his views are relevant and influential.

The pope cannot and does not separate the Jewish-Catholic relationship from the Israel-Hamas war. Francis has spoken often and highly personally about Jewish-Catholic relations and emphasized his commitment to deepening the connection between the two long-estranged communities. He has celebrated the remarkable changes that started with the Second Vatican Council, noting that “enemies and strangers have become friends and brothers” (10/28/15). Building upon the admirable endeavors of Popes John Paul II and Benedict XV, he has endorsed profound theological changes in Catholic teachings about Judaism and expressed sadness over Catholics’ past misdeeds against Jews (e.g., Evangelii Gaudium 248). Relevant here in particular are the popes’ expressions of support for the State of Israel (especially following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Holy See in 1993) and peacemaking endeavors for the region, which Francis has continued. He was warmly welcomed by national leadership during his visit to Israel in 2014 and emphatically insisted “the State of Israel has every right to exist in safety and prosperity” (10/28/15).

A sense of this fraught history and a Catholic responsibility to the Jewish people and the State of Israel emerges from his comments during his papacy. He insists that “to attack Jews is anti-Semitism, but an outright attack on the State of Israel is also anti-Semitism” (10/28/15). Catholics, above all, he says, should not be indifferent to such hostility. The Shoah is never far from his mind. Past hostility to Jews, manifest in violence and genocide, should guide the Church in the present and the future.

Speaking to a Jewish audience in Rome, he said Catholics should “always maintain the highest level of vigilance [against hostility toward Jews], in order to be able to intervene immediately in defense of human dignity and peace” (1/17/16). He insists here on an active stance, alert to such threats, “lest we become indifferent” (1/27/20). Responding to a letter from Jewish scholars written in November 2023 expressing deep concern over “the worst wave of antisemitism since 1945,” he says the Oct. 7 attack against Israel in particular reminds him that the promise “never again” remains relevant and must be taught and affirmed anew (2/2/24). Likewise, the Church’s commitment to opposing antisemitism remains firm. Because of the “path that the Church has walked with you,” he replied, it “rejects every form of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, unequivocally condemning manifestations of hatred towards Jews and Judaism as a sin against God.”

Francis’ statements following Oct. 7, 2023, are therefore disappointing on multiple levels. First, he does not fulfill his commitment to vigorously and publicly oppose antisemitism and anti-Judaism. By ignoring central aspects of the conflict, such as the motivations of the combatants, he actually undercuts his promise of vigilance and resistance against all such forms of hatred. Second, his view of the war is not constructive. Desiring to move Catholic theology away from just war theory and toward a nascent so-called just peace theory, he offers little practical or moral guidance in the present Israel-Hamas war. Instead, he misrepresents the nature of the conflict and simplistically presents highly complex and nuanced situations in service of his a priori views on war in general. While it would be unreasonable to expect him to become a partisan in the conflict or to dig deeply into the nature of the opposition Israel is facing, he has failed to consider the need for military self-defense or to assess whether antisemitic hatred of Jews—an explicit concern of his—lies behind any of the aggression and rhetoric against Israel.

Pope Francis’ statements on the conflict that started on Oct. 7 should be situated in the broader context of his thinking about war and violence. His principled opposition to any justification for war is both morally and logically questionable. On the one hand, he affirms the acceptability of self-defense through the use of force: “It is the right of those who are attacked to defend themselves” (10/11/23). As is widely understood, this right is not unlimited. Traditionally, one must satisfy the requirements both for initiating a war (jus ad bellum) and for prosecuting a war (jus in bello). Although Francis does not use these technical Latin terms, they are present behind his focus on the fate of “innocent victims” (10/11/23) and claim that “even when exercising the right of legitimate defence, it is essential to adhere to a proportionate use of force” (1/8/24; see also 9/29/24). There are also “various international conventions, signed by many countries,” that place restraints on certain actions (1/8/24, quoting Gaudium et Spes 79). A combatant must engage in a careful assessment of a variety of factors (including some not mentioned here) and only then it is possible that a war is permissible.

On the other hand, the pope is consistently unwilling to undertake an assessment of the acceptability of and justifications offered for this war. Despite having endorsed the possibility of the legitimate use of force (understanding that harm may result), he then evaluates the justice of Israeli military actions in general teleologically, that is, simply by whether they cause harm and suffering: “No war is worth the tears of a mother who has seen her child mutilated or killed; no war is worth the loss of the life of even one human being” (11/10/23). This approach avoids careful assessment of the goals, alternatives, and context in decisions about the justice of undertaking military action in favor of blunt denunciations of such actions because they cause harm. This latter standard of harm, with its powerful emotional character, supplants the earlier tradition of just war criteria (in particular jus ad bellum) without explanation. Now, one is asked to “see war for what it is: nothing other than an immense tragedy, a ‘useless slaughter’” (1/8/24). The terrible suffering of the victims leads him to jettison his own limited endorsement of violence for self-defense. In particular, he delegitimizes any action at all and even the process of assessing the extent of harm it might cause. The suffering of innocents as such, regardless of any larger context or military purpose, renders force and war unjust.

For example, when “unarmed civilians” are killed, “this is terrorism and war” (12/17/23). If true, then motive and context become irrelevant in his overly broad denunciation. But war and terrorism are, of course, not at all the same thing, unless one ignores important differences and only considers some generic level of suffering. Then the presumably intentional murder of innocents (terrorism) becomes indistinguishable from, say, proportional violence used for self-defense (some forms of war).

Speaking about war in general, Francis makes categorical judgments without sufficient consideration for specific circumstances. This renders even wars of self-defense, which could be at least theoretically justified, unacceptable. He repeatedly insists that, without exception, “every war leaves our world worse than it was before” (6/7/24). Dozens of times when discussing the Israel-Hamas conflict, he claims “Wars are / war is always a defeat” (e.g., 10/15/23, 10/29/23, 11/8/23, 11/19/23, 12/20/23, 2/7/24, 3/20/24, 4/24/24, 6/19/24, 8/4/24, 10/7/24). That is, wars, he says, are guaranteed to be a net loss. This evades the unavoidable hard questions that arise when thinking about the justness of a war, especially in response to aggression.

It is indisputable that both Israel’s and Hamas’ actions raise difficult and serious moral questions. There are complex assessments that must be made; even a refusal to make a choice is a choice. However, Francis seems to want to sidestep this difficult situation. While he hints at his awareness that there are unavoidable questions, he nonetheless rejects war in its entirety. He willingly risks being “deemed naive for choosing peace” (Fratelli Tutti 261), as if simply standing on the side of the “victims of violence” (as he says) is a moral or even plausible option.

In reality, there are almost always innocent victims on all sides, as there are in the Israel-Hamas war. It is misleading to suggest the focus should be only on how to show sympathy for victims (of course one should); rather, he should engage in a moral assessment of the actions of the combatants and extent and causes of civilian losses. Francis sidesteps this discussion with his demand that we “not remain mired in theoretical discussions” (FT 261). Despite his desire to avoid such discussions, however, a moral reckoning requires a difficult confrontation with all aspects of the use of violence, for not all violence is the same. Put another way, if all “war is in itself a crime against humanity,” then moral distinctions between how and why wars are fought disappear (1/14/24).

While it is of course true that nations can engage in war for base motives (failing to abide by the principles of jus ad bellum), Francis seems not to believe that there might be anything but base motives. Francis illustrates this when he introduces a false dichotomy when speaking about the Israel-Hamas war, between those who seek peace and those who are eager to embrace war. For example, he says, “We need to be vigilant and critical towards an ideology that is unfortunately dominant today, which claims that ‘conflict, violence and breakdown are part of the normal functioning of a society (FT 236)’” (6/7/24). This formulation is unduly simplistic and essentializing. He presents those who recognize that war can be necessary and just as not only misguided but captive to a malignant and dangerous worldview.

The pope chose to use this notorious verse at a time when global antisemitism has reached disturbingly high levels. Such a statement threatens the intellectual work of his Catholic predecessors going back to the 1960s.

Francis’ sweeping indictment of all wars, regardless of how or why they are fought, buttresses his claim that violence is inherently self-defeating (“always, always, always a defeat”)—a ruse orchestrated by those who want to increase suffering and death. There can be no justifiable military action, for what lurks behind claims that war is just is selfishness and greed: “What is really at stake [in war] are the power struggles between different social groups [and] partisan economic interests” (6/7/24). These, he argues, are what “really” prompt wars and conflict. As an example, he says war serves no goal but the enrichment of those who sell weapons. No people or country can presumably decide rationally and appropriately to employ force, for they are certain to suffer a net loss. “The only ones to gain [in war] are arms manufacturers” (11/19/23). They “profit the most” (4/24/24).

This is a reductionist perception of history, as if Francis can discern what motivates combatants. (Were Hitler’s motives in WWII in fact no different from those of Churchill and Roosevelt, and is it not possible to make any moral distinction between the war of conquest fought by the Nazis and the defensive wars fought by the nations they attacked and sought to obliterate?) In this way, Francis’ judgment becomes speculative and undermines his admission that some forms of war are acceptable (while tragic and undesirable). According to his logic here, however, war becomes inherently unacceptable. In effect, there is no longer any evaluation needed and no reason to consider the claims of a potential combatant. In fact, casting a skeptical eye over wars from “recent decades,” he bemoans that “every single war has been ostensibly ‘justified,’” maybe with surreptitious help from those who will profit (FT 258). Again, this sort of sweeping judgment is symptomatic of a false dichotomy and leads him to the opposite extreme: If wars have been justified on spurious grounds, then he demands “never again war.”

It is on these spurious foundations that Francis erects his misleading characterizations of the two main combatants in the Israel-Hamas war, the State of Israel and Hamas. In over a year, he has never once mentioned Hamas by name, though mentions of Israel are ubiquitous. This imbalance is significant, not just because it is unsettling to fail to name (and describe the tactics of) one of the aggressors to a conflict (especially one widely considered a terrorist group), but because his studied ambiguity precludes a critical engagement with the nature of Hamas and other opponents.

Francis’ thinking seems constrained by outdated assumptions about the parties to a conflict. He speaks as if he is commenting on a conflict between two warring nation-states. He addresses his comments to both parties equally (again, without naming Hamas), asking for a cease-fire and the release of hostages (10/11/23, 12/10/23, 6/7/24, 9/15/24). However, it is clear that his comments are actually relevant for and directed almost entirely at Israel. For example, in pleading for an end to fighting, he appeals to law (“international humanitarian law”), our shared humanity (“the defence of human dignity”), and practical political goals (1/8/24). These are couched in language suitable for a modern democracy such as Israel, which, at least in theory, aspires to legal and moral behavior. However, this imbalance reveals his misunderstanding of the nature of Hamas.

Hamas is above all an extreme religious group committed in principle to the violent elimination of the State of Israel, even at the cost of its members’ own lives and the lives of innocent fellow Palestinians under its rule. Its leaders publicly affirm a desire to murder Israeli civilians. Hamas’ very existence as a terrorist organization is a transgression of international law, as is its leaders’ promise that they would repeat the murderous violence of Oct. 7 “again and again” if given the chance. Neither moral nor legal expectations have any relevance to Hamas, even if it has also served as leadership in Gaza. In light of this terrible reality, Francis’ hope that “the leaders of nations and the parties in [this] conflict may find the way to peace and unity … [and] all recognize each other as brothers and sisters” (6/7/24; see also 9/13/24) seems not just imbalanced but indifferent to reality. Hamas has repeatedly said the opposite: It endorses unyielding violence until victory. In this conflict, then, only one party—Israel—has leaders who even speak the same moral “language” as Francis. His hope, then, perhaps could have made sense in a conflict between two modern nation-states. That is definitely not the nature of the present conflict, and it is puzzling that Francis persists in seeing or presenting it this way.

There are a wide range of explanations for and understandings of the hostility that exists between Israel and numerous state and nonstate actors. In some cases, there are relatively explicable, pragmatic reasons for conflict. This is clearest in the tragic conflict with Palestinians, given disputes over land, sovereignty, and control of holy sites, among other things. Regardless of one’s biases, it is generally possible to understand rationally why there have been decades of clashes between the sides. However, some of Israel’s opponents have much less rational goals in a pragmatic, political sense and are primarily influenced by ideologically and religiously based hostility. Thus, Hezbollah in Lebanon, following Israel’s 2006 withdrawal from a security zone in the south, lost the justification it gave for maintaining its aggression. Nonetheless, it vigorously continued to prepare for war and invasion. Iran and proxies such as the Yemeni Houthis, both more than a thousand miles away, lack any obvious reasons for hostility toward Israel. They have no dispute over resources or borders or competing historical claims. Likewise, with Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Hamas too achieved almost all its ostensible goals, including political power over Gaza. The vital thread connecting these opponents is the motivation for their antipathy: not practical and explicable interests, perhaps amenable to negotiation and resolution, but unyielding, religiously based hatred.

Irrational hatred, grounded in extremist religious and ideological claims, has exploded in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the last few decades, especially among Jews and Muslims and among Israelis and Arabs. Most relevant here is the emergence of vitriolic anti-Judaism and antisemitism among Palestinians and other Muslims. As noted, while some conflicts can be understood rationally, Israel’s opponents have increasingly expressed their motivations in explicitly theological terms, using venomous language not just against Israelis but against Jews and indeed all Westerners. This turns Israelis into Jewish enemies of God and usurpers of Muslim land; this also turns a traditionally political and secular conflict into a religious war.

For example, Hamas’ recent official video bluntly says, “O Lord … let us kill your enemies, the Jews.” Likewise, the language of other aggressors is viciously antisemitic and anti-Jewish. The Houthis’ slogan illustrates this as well: “God is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, A Curse Upon the Jews, Victory to Islam.” Hezbollah’s charter says its goal is Israel’s “final obliteration from existence.” Former leader Hassan Nasrallah spoke of Jews in terms borrowed from medieval antisemitism and anti-Jewish Quranic surahs (e.g., 82). Iran, the backer of these organizations, has made hatred of Israel and Jews a fundamental aspect of state policy since 1979 and, like Hezbollah, undertakes terror attacks against Jews throughout the world. Though sometimes these opponents insist they only hate Zionists or Israelis, not Jews, their actions and discourse indicate otherwise. Expressions of vicious hostility toward Jews, the use of traditional anti-Jewish tropes, and annihilationist threats of destruction of the only Jewish state are ubiquitous.

This context is directly relevant to Francis’ comments on and understanding of the Israel-Hamas war. Francis, with rare exceptions, ignores or minimizes the nature of the threats faced by Israel. While he usually speaks generally and succinctly about world events, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict consistently gets not only more attention than any other topic but typically occupies the first place in most of his reviews of international conflicts. Likewise, his specific commitment to the Jewish people reasonably raises expectations that he will be especially sensitive to threats to their well-being.

Without any military capabilities, all a pope has is his moral stature, and this current pope, who is widely respected, speaks with great authority on diverse moral questions. It is for this reason that his statements are so puzzling and undermine the admirable stances to which he has committed himself and the Church. Thus, it is surprising that Francis neglects to note that Israel’s enemies seek not a conventional military victory but the total destruction of the country and consequent immediate endangerment of all its citizens. This goal is uniquely malevolent. None of the other countries he mentions face state and / or nonstate actors seeking their physical elimination. (Russia’s attempt to conquer Ukraine does include acts of mass murder and is intended to impose brutal Russian control over the country.) Francis is sensitive to this possibility in general and denounces it: “No-one should threaten the existence of other [countries]” (4/14/24). Despite these avowed goals of Israel’s enemies, Francis never acknowledges this as distinctly genocidal in intent.

Francis harshly and regularly denounces terrorism (in the usual sense of the term) when looking at other parts of the world (e.g., an attack on innocent civilians in Kerman, Iran). He is also sensitive to the religious aspects of terrorist violence, especially for minority religious groups (1/6/24). However, when he mentions terrorism in the context of the Israel-Hamas war, he always lumps it in with other actions (such as “terrorism and war” [noted above, from 12/17/23] or “terrorism and extremism” [10/11/23, 1/8/24]). He never notes the distinctive features of terrorism nor the labeling of Hamas—the main aggressor in Gaza—as a terrorist organization. He obfuscates the deep moral divide between these two terrible but profoundly different acts.

Why does Francis fail to live up to the moral and historical commitments to Jews that he emphatically endorses? Does the appearance of anti-Judaism in the context of a war explain his silence? Perhaps he prefers to speak out against hatred of Jews only when Jews are exclusively victims.

Yet the presence of Jewish combatants (some of whom sometimes may transgress moral and international laws, as do members of all other legitimate armies) should not obviate his concern. From a moral and practical standpoint, there are, along with many Palestinian victims, Jewish victims, whose lives were lost because of the unyielding and genocidal acts of their aggressors. Do the terrible losses suffered by Palestinians make his concern for Jews moot? That would undermine the seriousness with which he speaks about the Jewish-Catholic relationship and suggest he has only finite reserves of compassion or imbalanced sympathies. Perhaps Francis hopes to maintain a future role as a negotiator and thus refrains from naming and describing Israel’s aggressors. That, however, seems a very high price to pay morally and reputationally for potential influence in negotiations in the future.

None of these explanations alone suffice here, for Francis’ political and religious views are complex and sometimes inconsistent. This might be understandable had not the Church determined to break with its own history of hostility toward the Jewish people and promised to say “no to any form of anti-Semitism and [to condemn] any insult, discrimination and persecution derived from that” (10/28/15). It is hard to see the pope’s recent statements as fulfillments of that promise.


Dr. Adam Gregerman is Professor of Jewish Studies in the Dept. of Theology and Religious Studies and Associate Director of the Institute for Jewish-Catholic Relations at Saint Joseph’s University in Philadelphia.


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‘Pulp Fiction’ Visionary Lawrence Bender to Executive Produce New Israeli Series Based on Oct. 7 Terror Attack

‘Pulp Fiction’ Visionary Lawrence Bender to Executive Produce New Israeli Series Based on Oct. 7 Terror Attack

Shiryn Ghermezian


A poster for “Red Alert.” Photo: Keshet

Legendary “Pulp Fiction” producer Lawrence Bender will be a co-executive producer on a new Israeli television series based on true events that took place during the deadly Hamas terrorist attacks in southern Israel last year.

The action-drama series titled “Red Alert” will premiere on Israel’s leading television channel Keshet 12, it was announced on Tuesday. The title for the series refers to the emergency Red Alert siren in Israel that indicates an imminent rocket fire. The show was developed in collaboration with Oct. 7 survivors and families of victims.

“This multicharacter drama blends incredible human stories of bravery, resilience, and defiance — many of which made news headlines around the world in the aftermath of this shocking terror attack — with intense military action,” according to a synopsis provided by Keshet International, which is the global distributor for the series. The show will begin filming in Israel in the spring in Hebrew, Arabic, and English.

“‘Red Alert’ will embark on an intense and emotional journey that explores the indomitable human spirit,” said Bender, whose credits include “Kill Bill,” “Good Will Hunting,” and “Inglourious Basterds.” “This international action drama will showcase the unwavering resolve of real people who confront unimaginable challenges to create a compelling viewing experience,” he added.

Bender’s films have been nominated for 36 Academy Awards and have won nine. His company, Bender Brown Productions, will co-produce “Red Alert” with Israel’s Green Productions. The series will also receive funding from multiple partners, including the Jewish National Fund USA – Israel Entertainment Fund (IEF). “Red Alert” is created, written, and will be directed by Lior Chefetz; co-created by Ruth Efroni; and co-written by Kineret Peled and Idan Hubel.

“Red Alert” is one of the first scripted dramas about the Oct. 7 massacre, noted Keren Shahar, CEO of Keshet International. She said the new series “will provide a unique perspective, distinct from news or documentaries, to create a powerful testament to the extraordinary capacity for hope and resilience that resides within us all.”

“The heroic stories and true events depicted will weave an action-driven tapestry that captures the incredible power of kindness, sacrifice, and altruism in a way that connects on a deeply emotional level,” she explained. Co-executive producer Jordana Reuben Yechiel added that “Red Alert” will highlight the “extraordinary people” who “when faced with life and death choices, rose up to be heroes.”

“For a while, there seemed to be no reasonable dramatic approach to retell such a profound event,” said Karni Ziv, head of drama and comedy for Keshet 12. “We needed time and perspective to find the right project and the right creative partners to help us tell this story in the right way. In ‘Red Alert,’ the human drama transcends the war, which sometimes serves as background and sometimes as the story itself, to deliver a message of hope and solidarity.”

Casting for “Red Alert” is currently in progress. The five-part series is scheduled to premiere on Keshet 12 in October 2025 to coincide with the second anniversary of the Hamas attack in Israel.


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Cztery powody, dla których Izrael zgodził się na zawieszenie broni z Hezbollahem [LE FIGARO]

Mężczyzna macha libańską flagą, stojąc pośród gruzów budynku zniszczonego w izraelskich atakach, po tym, jak zawieszenie broni między Izraelem a wspieraną przez Iran grupą Hezbollah weszło w życie o godzinie 02:00, Tyr w Libanie, 27 listopada 2024 r.


Cztery powody, dla których Izrael zgodził się na zawieszenie broni z Hezbollahem [LE FIGARO]

Clotilde Jégousse / Le Figaro


Premier Benjamin Netanjahu ogłosił we wtorek zawieszenie broni w Libanie. Jakie powody wojskowe i dyplomatyczne stoją za tą decyzją?

„Jeszcze dziś wieczorem przedstawię gabinetowi do zatwierdzenia projekt zawieszenia broni w Libanie. Czas trwania rozejmu zależy od tego, co wydarzy się w Libanie”, ogłosił premier Izraela w telewizji we wtorek 26 listopada. Porozumienie to zostało osiągnięte po prawie dwóch miesiącach walk lądowych w południowym Libanie, gdzie armia Izraela konfrontuje się z Hezbollahem, szyicką organizacją polityczno-militarną, która została osłabiony przez naloty i śmierć sporej części jej dowództwa.

* * *

Izrael ogłasza zawieszenie broni dosłownie kilkanaście godzin po nasileniu ataków na Liban. Czy to pana zaskakuje?

David Khalfa, dyrektor Observatoire de l’Afrique du Nord et du Moyen-Orient w Fondation Jean Jaurès: – Z wojskowego punktu widzenia jest to logiczne: każda ze stron stara się zdobyć punkty rzutem na taśmę, tuż przed podpisaniem zawieszenia broni intensyfikując swoje ataki. Jest to rodzaj wojny psychologicznej, którą pruski generał Carl von Clausewitz nazwał „dialektyką woli”.

Premier Izraela Benjamin Netanjahu oświadczył, że popiera amerykańską propozycję zawieszenia broni w wojnie przeciwko Hezbollahowi w Libanie i zarekomenduje swojemu rządowi, by przyjął to porozumienie. Haim Zach/REPORTER

We wtorek rano Izrael rozpoczął operację powietrznodesantową swoich sił specjalnych, które dotarły do rzeki Litani, 25-30 kilometrów od granicy. To pierwsza taka operacja w tym kraju od niemal 20 lat – do tej pory piechota była skoncentrowana na samym południu Libanu, około 6 kilometrów od granicy. W tym dzisiejszym ataku zniszczono prawie tysiąc pocisków rakietowych Hezbollahu, co jest ilością absolutnie znaczącą dla operacji tego typu. Pokazuje to, że w momencie podpisywania umowy istniało pragnienie utrzymania równowagi sił. Jest to również sposób na uspokojenie ludności północnego Izraela, która od dawna domagała się takiej operacji.

Ze swojej strony Hezbollah musi symetrycznie pokazywać do końca, że przetrwał ataki izraelskiej armii i że utrzymuje sztandar islamskiego oporu. W ciągu dwóch miesięcy izraelskiej ofensywy w Libanie ta szyicka milicja została poważnie osłabiona. Jej siły bojowe straciły prawie 10 proc. stanu osobowego, a jej zdolności powietrzno-balistyczne zostały poważnie nadwątlone, zwłaszcza pociski rakietowe średniego i dalekiego zasięgu (zniszczono od 60 do 80 proc. ich zapasów). W tego typu asymetrycznym konflikcie „słabi” muszą narzucić swoją narrację. Dlatego też Hezbollah nasila swoje ataki aż do ostatniej chwili, zmuszając prawie milion Izraelczyków z obszarów przygranicznych do schronienia się w większych miastach.

Oczywiste jest, że do ostatniej chwili trwa wyścig z czasem, aby wyjść zwycięsko z tej kolejnej rundy, jak w meczu bokserskim, w którym wynik ustalany jest po zakończeniu zwarcia.

Co Izrael zyska poprzez zgodę na zawieszenie broni i dlaczego zgadza się akurat teraz?

– Istnieją cztery główne powody.

Pierwszym jest oczywiście faktyczne osłabienie militarne Hezbollahu. Do niedawna ta szyicka milicja chciała połączyć i zsynchronizować fronty północny i południowy, czyli zapewnić wszystkich, że za każdym razem, gdy dojdzie do konfrontacji między Hamasem a Izraelem, proirańska milicja od razu rozpali front północny, aby zmusić armię izraelską do mobilizacji swoich oddziałów – rezerwistów i sił czynnych – nękać ją tym, z korzyścią dla irańskiego reżimu. Tak już nie jest: Naim Qassem, następca zabitego w nalocie szejka Nasrallaha, wziął pod uwagę osłabienie militarne Hezbollahu po dwóch miesiącach intensywnych operacji naziemnych Cahalu i porzucił “zasadę synchronizacji”. Zawieszenie broni pozwala zatem Izraelowi faktycznie oddzielić front północny od południowego.

Jest to strategiczna szansa, zwłaszcza że – i to jest drugi powód – wśród izraelskich żołnierzy zmobilizowanych i wysłanych na front panuje swego rodzaju wypalenie. Ci, którzy walczą na północy, to ci sami, którzy walczyli w Gazie. Obecnie zresztą toczy się wojna na siedmiu frontach, co oznacza, że izraelska obrona powietrzna musi być stale w pogotowiu. Pojawiła się potrzeba demobilizacji części tych żołnierzy, z których wielu to potrzebni z powrotem do pracy obywatele, rezerwiści. Sześćdziesięciu siedmiu żołnierzy zginęło na samym froncie północnym od czasu rozpoczęcia operacji lądowej dwa miesiące temu, a prawie tysiąc w walkach w ciągu ostatniego roku. Dla kraju wielkości Izraela to bardzo wysoka liczba ofiar.

Trzecim czynnikiem jest to, że cele Izraela na północy są znacznie skromniejsze niż na południu. W przeciwieństwie do Strefy Gazy, gdzie celem jest doprowadzenie do zniszczenia Hamasu, tutaj celem było tylko zneutralizowanie bezpośredniego zagrożenia stwarzanego przez Hezbollah. Chodziło o zniszczenie fortyfikacji, sieci tuneli, a przede wszystkim zapasów broni i zdziesiątkowanie sił specjalnych al-Radwan, czyli elitarnych oddziałów „Partii Boga”. Zagrożenie wprawdzie nie zniknęło, ale jest już w dużej mierze opanowane.

Wreszcie, istnieje czynnik polityczny, związany z amerykańskimi wyborami.

Po stronie izraelskiej istniała obawa, że ustępująca administracja Joe Bidena zachowa się jak Barack Obama w przededniu odejścia z urzędu: pozwolił on wtedy na przyjęcie wiążącej rezolucji w Radzie Bezpieczeństwa ONZ, potępiającej osiedla na Zachodnim Brzegu [rezolucja 2334, przyjęta w 2016 r.] Izraelczycy obawiali się podobnej rezolucji dotyczącej Libanu i Strefy Gazy, która byłaby dla nich mniej korzystna niż zawarte z Hezbollahem porozumienie. To zatem sposób na uprzedzenie dyplomatycznej porażki.

Czy uważa pan, że wydanie przez MTK nakazów aresztowania Netanjahu i jego byłego ministra obrony Joawa Gallanta było czynnikiem, który odegrał rolę?

– Dyskusje o tym trwają już od kilku tygodni, ale może istnieć pośredni związek. Jestem przekonany, że Izrael spodziewał się dojścia do władzy Donalda Trumpa. A ten wielokrotnie pokazywał swoją gotowość do przejęcia inicjatywy: wzywał do zakończenia działań wojennych zarówno w Strefie Gazy, jak i na północy. Co więcej, został wybrany częściowo dzięki głosom libańskich Amerykanów, którzy stanowią duży segment arabsko-amerykańskiego elektoratu. Ze swojej strony Izraelczycy liczą na to, że Trump zneutralizuje wpływ nakazów aresztowania (poprzez zamrożenie aktywów prokuratorów i wywarcie presji na mocarstwa sprzymierzone ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi, aby odstąpiły od aresztowania Netanjahu i Gallanta, jeśli znajdą się na ich terytorium). Aby uzyskać tego rodzaju działania, Izraelczycy doszli do wniosku, że muszą pokazać Trumpowi swoje wysiłki i zdali sobie sprawę, jak ważne jest, aby nadchodząca administracja położyła kres takim działaniom MTK.

Jakie mogą być konsekwencje rozejmu?

– Izraelczycy mają nadzieję, że Hamas, który znalazł się w izolacji, również złagodzi swoje stanowisko w sprawie zawieszenia broni. Ale nic nie wskazuje na to, że tak się stanie. Do tej pory stanowisko Hamasu zawsze było takie samo: uzależniają uwolnienie zakładników od całkowitego wycofania izraelskich sił ze Strefy Gazy. Po zabiciu Jahji Sinwara Izrael miał nadzieję na zmianę stanowiska, ale zostało ono utrzymane przez jego następców. Jednak koalicja kierowana przez Netanjahu doskonale wie, że przyjęcie tego warunku hamasowców byłoby postrzegane jako kapitulacja przez dużą liczbę Izraelczyków, zwłaszcza z prawicy, i przyspieszyłoby upadek rządu.


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A necessary though imperfect deal caps Netanyahu’s finest hour

A necessary though imperfect deal caps Netanyahu’s finest hour


Jonathan S. Tobin


The ceasefire with Hezbollah won’t ensure the safety of northern Israel. But could anyone else have resisted U.S. heat for so long and achieved as much?

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks to IDF soldiers during a visit to the northern border on May 28, 2024. Photo by Amos Ben-Gershom/GPO.

There are a good many reasons to worry that the impending ceasefire with Hezbollah terrorists that Israel has chosen to accept is a bad bargain. A lot can go wrong, and there are no assurances that the quiet it promises will last. And yet, the deal that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has agreed to is probably the best Israel can get under the circumstances. Even critics of the decision must acknowledge that the Jewish state has not come away from the negotiations empty-handed but has achieved some real gains.

After a year of suffering incessant attacks on its northern communities that began on Oct. 8—just one day after the Hamas-led massacres in the south—Israel has finally forced Hezbollah and Iran to retreat from their determination to keep firing as long as Hamas is fighting in Gaza. This isolation of Hamas, which renders their continued efforts to sustain the war on Israel it began on Oct. 7, 2023, far more precarious, is a victory for the Jewish state.

So, too, is the fact that the last two months of Israeli attacks on Hezbollah have significantly degraded their capacity to inflict harm on the region. That’s a defeat for Iran, which had hoped that the seven-front war on Israel it had incited could go on indefinitely, weakening the country and its citizens’ resolve. Instead, they are the ones who have been diminished by military setbacks and vast losses inflicted on a group whose main purpose is to serve as a deterrent to attacks on Iran.

Equally important, this is a moment to consider that the setbacks dealt Hezbollah and Iran, coupled with the destruction of Hamas’s military capabilities, were only made possible by the determination and the ability of one man to stand up to U.S. pressure to abandon the fight for Israel’s security many months ago. It’s difficult to imagine anyone other than Netanyahu could have stood his ground against Washington’s pleadings and threats, and have gone on to achieve an outcome that leaves Israel’s enemies far weaker than they were when the current conflict began almost 14 months ago.

Netanyahu’s remarkable stand

For all of his faults and his stubborn refusal to cede power after so many years in office, as well as the fact that he bears some of the responsibility for the Oct. 7 catastrophe that happened on his watch, what Netanyahu has done in the year since then is truly remarkable.

Only someone with his steely determination and savvy understanding of the tricky dynamics of the U.S.-Israel relationship could have navigated the long months of war so skillfully. No possible successor in his own Likud Party or among his opponents in the Knesset could have stuck to his goals—and do so much harm to Hamas and Hezbollah in the face of the desire of his country’s sole superpower ally to force Jerusalem to accept the continued rule of Hamas in Gaza and avoid direct conflict with Iran’s Lebanese auxiliaries.

Whatever comes next—whether it is a renewed war with Hezbollah caused by their refusal to keep the ceasefire or to abide by its terms that demand they withdraw their terrorist cadres and weapons north of the Litani River, or the bloody continuation of the mopping up of what’s left of Hamas’s terrorists in Gaza—Netanyahu’s leadership has been indispensable.

He may ultimately be judged by Israel’s voters as being too tainted by his association with the worst day in their country’s history to serve another term. But his service as prime minister during the last terrible year of intense battle will still deserve to be remembered with honor. It was a period during which it was only his insistence on sticking to a goal of eliminating Hamas and dealing deadly blows to Hezbollah and Iran—while cabinet colleagues, political foes and military advisers were willing to give in to the Americans and accept far more disastrous deals—that prevented a diplomatic and military defeat for Israel.

Reasons to worry

Those who are outraged at the deal with Hezbollah have reason to be concerned.

The Iranian proxy group has never kept its word about anything, let alone agreements to stop attacking Israel or to withdraw from the southern part of Lebanon over which it has largely ruled for a generation. For those who hoped the Israeli offensive that began in September would only end in the complete defeat of Hezbollah, the announcement of the agreement is a disappointment. That is especially true when one thinks of the sacrifices that the soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces have made to achieve what may only be a temporary respite to the fighting.

Nor can Israel rely on the United States or France to take action to guarantee that Hezbollah will not simply move its terrorist forces and missiles back to Israel’s border as soon as the IDF withdraws. No matter the provocation, only Israeli action (which will likely again be demonized and subjected to lawfare attacks by the international community) can defend the security of the Jewish state.

What’s more, the tens of thousands of Israelis who were forced to flee their homes after the Iranian proxy group began firing on northern Israel last October have no reliable guarantee that they will be safe if they go back.

On top of all that, it must also be acknowledged that pressure from the Biden administration, which has always been more interested in appeasing Iran and forcing Israel to accept ceasefires with both Hezbollah and Hamas, was part of the equation that led to this decision.

Will that encourage whoever is in charge of U.S. foreign policy in the next two months—whether it is a visibly diminished Biden or someone else—to push for a binding U.N. Security Council resolution that would impose a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip that will help what’s left of Hamas to survive and ultimately take back power there?

Yet despite all of that, those inclined to view the cessation of war in the north as a defeat for Israel need to consider how much it has gained in the last several months.

The myth of Hezbollah exploded

Iran and its Lebanese henchmen had counted on Israel being too intimidated by the prospect of another round of fighting with a Hezbollah force that had more than 120,000 rockets and missiles pointed at it. The evisceration of the leadership of the terrorist group and sustained damage done to its forces and arms caches confounded those who thought the Jewish state was too weak to achieve such a result. While Hezbollah and Iran will over time reorganize, rearm and recoup their losses, they also now know that their hubristic confidence that they were invincible has been exposed as a myth.

The fact that Hezbollah was forced by its losses to accept a ceasefire without it being tied to an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is also an enormous setback for Iran’s multifront war strategy.

Though the next two months will remain a period of extreme danger for Israel, Netanyahu’s decision should also solidify his relationship with the incoming Trump administration. The president-elect has been open about his hope that Israel will conclude its wars in Gaza and Lebanon before he is sworn in on Jan. 20.

A deal that would disarm Hamas, guarantee it could not come back to power in Gaza and gain the release of the remaining 101 Israeli hostages still being held by the terrorists may be unlikely, given the fanaticism of the Islamists even after their abandonment by their Lebanese allies. Yet by concluding a deal with Hezbollah, Netanyahu can say he’s done as much as he can to give Trump a clean slate and be able to further strengthen the U.S. obligation to back the Jewish state to the hilt if the terrorists violate the accord.

The ceasefire in the north will also enable the IDF to concentrate on the tough task of mopping up Hamas guerrillas in Gaza after Netanyahu’s staunch refusal to accept Biden’s ultimatums to stand down made the destruction of their formal military forces possible.

Restoring deterrence

Oct. 7 was an enormous blow to Israel’s ability to deter its enemies and undermined confidence in its reputation as the “strong horse” in the region that could inspire Arab states to resist Iran. But the victories that the IDF achieved, albeit at the terrible price of approximately 900 soldiers and police officers slain fighting their nation’s genocidal foes, have restored its strategic position. With Hezbollah weakened and Hamas on the run, as well as with much of its own air defenses being taken out by Israeli military action, Tehran is far weaker than it was on Oct. 6, 2023.

None of that will convince those who hate Netanyahu—and falsely accuse him of undermining democracy and being a corrupt authoritarian—to admire him. Nor will they stop their incessant resistance to his government, whereby he is not only blamed for Oct. 7 (a guilt he shares with the entire leadership of the IDF and Israel’s intelligence establishment) but for Hamas’s refusal to release the hostages.

The lion’s share of the credit for the victories the IDF has achieved belongs to the soldiers who paid for them in blood. But honest observers must also acknowledge that it’s not likely that any other conceivable Israeli leader would have had the guts and the stiff spine to fend off a year of American pressure that made them possible. Certainly not Netanyahu’s political opponents Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, who folded in the face of far less American pressure in 2021 to give up Israeli natural-gas fields to Hezbollah in a failed attempt at appeasement. Nor can one imagine anyone else in the Likud-led coalition government having the knowledge or the resolve that Netanyahu showed time and again.

The prime minister has been around too long, behaved too arrogantly and made too many enemies to ever be given universal praise, no matter what he’s done. But while opinion about him will always be mixed at best, his post-Oct. 7 stand has been his finest hour. One can only hope future historians will give him his due for what he’s accomplished in the last year.


Jonathan S. Tobin is editor-in-chief of JNS (Jewish News Syndicate). Follow him @jonathans_tobin


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Sia Dedicates ‘Titanium’ Performance to Nova Survivors at Star-Studded Jewish Event

Sia Dedicates ‘Titanium’ Performance to Nova Survivors at Star-Studded Jewish Event

Shiryn Ghermezian


Sia performing at Anti-Defamation League’s 30th annual “In Concert Against Hate” on Nov. 18, 2024. Photo: Provided/Getty

Grammy-nominated Australian singer Sia performed on Monday night a slow rendition of her hit song “Titanium” in honor of survivors of the Nova music festival massacre that took place in southern Israel last year.

The performance took place at the Anti-Defamation League’s 30th annual “In Concert Against Hate,” a star-studded event inside the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, DC. It included remarks by America actor Blair Underwood and performances by Israeli singer Eden Golan of her original song “October Rain,” which she had to rewrite with different lyrics to perform at the 2024 Eurovision Song Contest under the title “Hurricane,” and a rendition of “Oseh Shalom” by the National Symphony Orchestra. The event’s emcee was Jewish-American actor Ben Stiller and attendees included Jewish activists, philanthropists, and Jewish leaders.

Sia, who originally recorded “Titanium” with producer and DJ David Guetta, dedicated her performance on Monday night to survivors of the Hamas-led terrorist attack that took place at the Nova music festival in Re’im, Israel, on Oct. 7, 2023. The song includes lyrics such as “Machine gun, fired at the ones who run…” She sings in the chorus: “I’m bulletproof, nothing to lose/Fire away, fire away/Ricochet, you take your aim/Fire away, fire away/You shoot me down, but I won’t fall/I am titanium.”

Sia was introduced on stage by Nova survivor Danielle Gelbaum, who said the singer’s music “gave me the opportunity to know that I will dance and I am dancing again. And tonight, we will dance again.” Gelbaum said on stage that her first time seeing Sia in concert was in Israel in 2016 with her older sister, who also survived the Nova music festival terrorist attack last year. She had the opportunity to met Sia earlier this year at an exhibit in Los Angeles dedicated to the deadly Nova attack. Survivors of the massacre — in which hundreds were murdered and 40 others were taken as hostages — also joined Sia on stage after her performance, which was accompanied by the National Symphony Orchestra.

The singer last performed in Israel in 2016 and was one of hundreds in the entertainment industry who signed an open letter in 2022 rejecting a cultural boycott of Israel. Sia met with Golan backstage at the event on Monday night and the Israeli singer shared a photo of them together on Instagram.

During his opening remarks on stage, Stiller talked about the rise of antisemitism in the world and joked about hiding his Jewish heritage — before he began listing the several Jewish characters he has played on screen. “It’s a very tough time in the world right now. So much anxiety, uncertainty. So much hate in the world,” he said. “But tonight we’re going to battle hate with a healthy dose of hope.”

Music executive Scooter Braun, whose clients include Justin Bieber and Ariana Grande, was honored at Monday night’s event with the ADL’s Spotlight Award, for his work in bringing an exhibit about the Nova massacre to the United States. The grandson of Holocaust survivors, he said, “I grew up with the idea of ‘Never again.’ Never again will we walk to our deaths; never again will we be scared.”

“That training — I never thought that I’d have to put it into my everyday life, into my work,” added Braun, whose maternal grandparents met at an ADL event. “These Nova survivors have given me the greatest gift. Because my whole life I was taught ‘Never again’ and something changed after I met these kids. Because they live by this mantra, ‘We will dance again’ … I want to say, again we will be strong, and again we will be proud and again we will dance. Again and again and again.”


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