Benjamin Netanjahu i Donald Trump (Fot. REUTERS/Kevin Mohatt)

Trump: Izrael zgodził się na rozejm w Gazie. Koniec wojny już w najbliższych dniach?

Marta Urzędowska

Realna szansa na rozejm? Trump spotka się z Netanjahu i będzie “bardzo zdecydowany”

Oświadczenie Trumpa pasuje do pojawiających się od kilku dni doniesień, że rosną szanse na rozejm w Strefie Gazy. W enklawie trwa wojna rozpoczęta przez Hamas atakiem na Izrael z 2023 r., w którym terroryści zabili 1,2 tys. osób, a 250 porwali do Gazy. W izraelskich odwetowych nalotach i operacjach lądowych zginęło już ponad 56 tys. Palestyńczyków, enklawa została niemal zrównana z ziemią, a sytuacja humanitarna dwóch milionów jej mieszkańców jest dramatyczna, bo Izrael poważnie ogranicza dostarczanie na miejsce jedzenia, wody i leków.

Dziś wygląda na to, że pojawiła się realna szansa na zawieszenie broni. Trump nie tylko zapewnia, że Izraelczycy już zgodzili się na rozejm, ale w najbliższych dniach spotka się w tej sprawie w Waszyngtonie z premierem Benjaminem Netanjahu i zapowiada, że podczas tej rozmowy będzie „bardzo zdecydowany”.

Według Trumpa również Netanjahu jest za szybkim zawieszeniem broni. – On tego chce, mówię wam, naprawdę tego chce – zapewniał Amerykanin we wtorek 1 lipca. – Myślę, że w przyszłym tygodniu będziemy mieli deal.

Pojazdy izraelskiej armii (widoczne w chmurze pyłu) operujące na granicy Strefy Gazy Fot. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

Wcześniej Waszyngton w tej samej sprawie odwiedził izraelski minister ds. strategii Ron Dermer, który spotkał się z przedstawicielami administracji Trumpa.

Izrael i Hamas nie potwierdzają, że są bliskie rozejmu. Wcześniej stanowiska radykalnie się różniły

Według źródeł CNN Katarczycy przekazali już obu stronom nową propozycję rozejmu, ale na razie nie wiadomo, na co dokładnie zgodzili się Izraelczycy i co myśli o niej Hamas.

Poprzednie próby dogadania się przynosiły albo krótkie rozejmy, albo w ogóle kończyły się fiaskiem. Izraelczycy żądali od terrorystów kapitulacji i rozbrojenia, co Hamas zawsze wykluczał, domagając się z kolei pełnego wycofania izraelskiej armii i trwałego zakończenia wojny, co zdecydowanie odrzucał Izrael.

Nie jest też jasne, co proponowany przez Trumpa rozejm oznacza dla izraelskich zakładników nadal przetrzymywanych w Gazie. Na miejscu pozostaje ok. dwudziestu żyjących osób i ok. trzydziestki ciał zabitych zakładników. W poprzednich negocjacjach Hamas proponował zwolnienie dziesięciu osób, Izrael domagał się zwolnienia wszystkich.

Na razie optymistyczne zapewnienia płyną niemal wyłącznie z Waszyngtonu – Izrael i Hamas nie potwierdzają oficjalnie, że są bliskie rozejmu. Jedynie ambasador Izraela przy ONZ Danny Danon przekonywał we wtorek w rozmowie z BBC, że Izrael jest „absolutnie gotowy na zawieszenie broni”. Jednocześnie zastrzegł, że jeśli Hamas nie zgodzi się na porozumienie, „jedyną opcją będzie większa presja militarna”.

Rozejm w Strefie Gazy. Hamas bardziej skłonny do ustępstw, bo Izrael i USA osłabiły Teheran

Amerykański prezydent nie bez powodu chwali się, że lada dzień zakończy ciągnącą się od blisko dwóch lat wojnę. Tydzień temu skutecznie zakończył inną, jeszcze groźniejszą bliskowschodnią eskalację. Przez blisko dwa tygodnie trwała izraelsko-irańska wymiana ciosów rozpoczęta atakiem Izraela na Iran, podczas którego Izraelczycy zniszczyli Irańczykom wojskowe i nuklearne obiekty i pozabijali najważniejszych dowódców i naukowców od atomu. Do wojny na chwilę włączyli się Amerykanie, bombardując trzy ważne irańskie ośrodki nuklearne potężnymi bombami, zdolnymi niszczyć także ukryte pod ziemią instalacje, choć do końca nie jest jasne, jak duże są zniszczenia.

Choć przez chwilę wydawało się, że amerykański atak może nasilić eskalację, a nawet wciągnąć USA w bliskowschodnią awanturę, sytuację udało się uspokoić – Irańczycy odpowiedzieli jedynie symbolicznie, Amerykanie ogłosili, że kończą konfrontację, a Trump w wyjątkowo ostrych słowach zmusił obie strony do zawieszenia broni.

Osłabienie Iranu to jeden z powodów, dla których dziś może być łatwiej o rozejm w Gazie. Teheran to najważniejszy sojusznik i sponsor Hamasu, a dziś ma za dużo własnych problemów, żeby upominać się o palestyńskich podopiecznych. Może to oznaczać, że hamasowcy będą bardziej skłonni do ustępstw, szczególnie że w ub. roku kilkumiesięczną wojną Izrael mocno osłabił też ich drugiego sojusznika, libański Hezbollah.

Palestyńczycy w drodze po pomoc humanitarną w Chan Junis w Strefie Gazy Fot. REUTERS/Hatem Khaled

Źródła w izraelskiej armii przekonują w rozmowie z CNN, że także Izraelczycy są dziś bardziej gotowi do zawarcia porozumienia, bo choć nie udało im się w pełni pokonać terrorystów, Hamas jest dziś tak osłabiony i zdziesiątkowany, że izraelska armia nie jest już w stanie skutecznie polować na niedobitki grupy.

Izrael nasila ataki. Eksperci od pomagania alarmują: Pomoc sprzeczna ze standardami

Na razie sytuacja na miejscu pozostaje daleka od spokoju. W ostatnich dniach izraelska armia wydała nakazy ewakuacji dla mieszkańców miasta Gaza i innych obszarów na północy enklawy, po czym rozpoczęła serię ataków, w których zginęło kilkadziesiąt osób, wśród nich ponad dwadzieścia w zbombardowanej w poniedziałek nadmorskiej kawiarni.

W ostatnich tygodniach regularnie dochodzi też do ataków na Palestyńczyków gromadzących się w okolicach ośrodków dystrybucji pomocy humanitarnej. Chodzi o centra, w których dystrybucję prowadzi Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), wspierana przez USA i Izrael organizacja pośrednicząca w dostarczaniu pomocy prywatnymi kanałami, przy udziale izraelskiej armii. Izrael pozwolił na taką formę pomagania kiedy zablokował pomoc świadczoną tradycyjnymi kanałami, za pośrednictwem ONZ. Według Izraelczyków taka zmiana to jedyny sposób, by pomoc nie trafiała w ręce Hamasu.

Z izraelską oceną nie zgadzają się czołowe organizacje pomocowe, które we wtorek wystosowały wspólny apel, w którym proszą o zlikwidowanie GHF. Przekonują, że taka forma pomagania jest sprzeczna z międzynarodowymi standardami i niebezpieczna. Tłumaczą, że potrzebujący Palestyńczycy są zmuszeni do przychodzenia pod ośrodki pomocy, często na niebezpieczne, zmilitaryzowane tereny, gdzie dochodzi do groźnych incydentów – od maja zginęły w nich setki osób. Apel podpisali przedstawiciele ponad 170 organizacji, wśród nich światowi liderzy w pomaganiu, jak Oxfam czy Save the Children.

Redagowała Ludmiła Anannikova

Israel owes Trump, but that can’t mean Hamas’s survival

Jonathan S. Tobin

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the scene where a ballistic missile fired from Iran hit and caused damage at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, June 20, 2025. Credit: Itai Ron/POOL.

President Donald Trump’s decision to order a strike on Iranian nuclear targets was yet another example of how he has proven to be a reliable friend of the State of Israel. If, as both Jerusalem and the Pentagon say, Tehran’s quest for a bomb have been set back at least two years—and can again be smashed by subsequent Israeli and American military efforts as needed—then it’s clear that the president has altered the strategic equation in the region in favor of the Jewish state and against its enemies. He has also continued to supply Israel with the arms it needs, rather than slow-walk them, and to encourage its campaign to destroy Hamas in Gaza, rather than to hamstring its efforts, as the Biden administration did.

Put in context to his groundbreaking pro-Israel decisions during his first term, the president added to a record that eclipses the support offered by any other administration since the founding of the modern-day Jewish state in 1948. All of which means that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is obligated to Trump above and beyond the normal deference owed to Israel’s superpower ally.

A price too high?

Yet exactly how far should Netanyahu go to pay that debt when the president demands that he go along with plans that may or may not be in his country’s best interests?

It may be that in the coming days, weeks and months, the world will find out the answer to that question.

It is now being widely reported that Israel has agreed to the terms of another ceasefire-hostage release deal with the Hamas terrorists that is being pushed by the president. If leaks about America’s offer to the Islamist group are true, it will mean the release of 10 of the remaining living hostages (without being first humiliated by revolting ceremonies in which they would be forced to thank their kidnappers) and 18 bodies of deceased captives in exchange for the release of Palestinian Arab terrorists and a 60-day halt to fighting.

If that’s all there is to it, that’s a deal that Netanyahu, who will visit Washington next week, can live with, as can even the most right-wing members of his government. But as the prime minister has stated, he believes that any deal must not obligate Israel to end the war on Hamas without forcing the surrender of all remaining hostages and bodies, as well as the leaders of the end of the Islamist terror group’s rule in Gaza and the exile of all of its leaders. Should the United States force an end to the conflict without that happening, no amount of rhetoric from Trump or Netanyahu will prevent Hamas from claiming victory. And despite all the losses they have sustained since starting this war while committing unspeakable atrocities on Oct. 7, 2023, such boasts will be largely accurate.

Will the post-Oct. 7 war against Hamas end in that fashion? We don’t yet know.

In keeping with the eliminationist beliefs that have been at the core of the Palestinian national movement since its inception in the 20th century, Hamas could well refuse to accept the terms that Trump’s envoys have exchanged with them, and with Egyptian and Qatari intermediaries that have been part of the negotiations. Even if they do, their intransigence—and ideological and religious commitment to violence and the shedding of Jewish blood—could prevent any talks during the 60 days of a ceasefire from blossoming into a long-term agreement that could be represented as the end of the war.

The willingness of Hamas to postpone the achievement of its commitment to Israel’s destruction and the genocide of its population is not the only variable here. There are other factors to consider.

Pressure on Netanyahu

One is the constant domestic pressure on Netanyahu from both the families of some of the hostages and his political opponents to end the war and to achieve the release of all the captives, regardless of whether it means allowing Hamas to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.

Just as important as the back-and-forth among Israelis about whether it’s time to end the fighting without first securing the defeat of Hamas is what Trump wants out of all this. The president has openly expressed a desire to end the war in Gaza and to use that, along with the crippling of Iran and its terrorist proxies, to expand the Abraham Accords. That is the X factor in the negotiations that could well force Netanyahu to make concessions he wouldn’t otherwise be inclined to give up.

To date, Netanyahu has reiterated that he won’t allow that to happen. But if Hamas is prepared to act in accordance with its best interests as opposed to its bloodthirsty ideology and Trump demands it, would he be forced to give in?

That’s likely the assumption in Trumpworld. It’s also something that many of Netanyahu’s supporters fear.

There’s no question that the U.S. president is willing to pressure Israel, whether publicly or privately, when he thinks that it’s in his interests. His profane demand that Israeli planes be turned around before striking Iran again when Tehran violated the ceasefire is an example.

Expanding the Abraham Accords

It’s also necessary to reiterate the obvious fact that, as much as the interests of the two allies are aligned, they are not identical. Perhaps the president thinks that holding Israel back from finally finishing the job against Hamas in Gaza can lead to what he wants: an expanded Abraham Accords with, as its centerpiece, Saudi Arabia formally recognizing the State of Israel.

That’s something Netanyahu has also stated as the main goal of his diplomatic plans. If it happens, it would be a remarkable achievement considering that the desert monarchy is the guardian of Islam’s holiest places and, for the first seven decades of Israel’s existence, was the lynchpin of the Arab and Muslim world’s unflinching hostility to the existence of the Jewish state.

It also fits perfectly into Trump’s transactional vision for the Middle East, in which all nations act in their self-interest, and prioritize trade and good relations with the West while turning their backs on rogue terrorist regimes like that of Iran.

While the prospect of such a game-changing diplomatic event has been endlessly talked up by both the Trump administration and Netanyahu’s government as not merely possible but inevitable, some skepticism about this is warranted.

If, as we have every reason to believe, not only the nuclear threat but the power of Iran to create mayhem in the Middle East has been seriously degraded, that effectively removes a key incentive for the Saudis to recognize Israel.

Their shift toward a productive, albeit under-the-table relationship with Israel dates back to the Barack Obama administration’s attempt to appease Iran. Far from being motivated by the royal family’s conversion to Zionism from the extreme Wahabi strain of Islam that was the driving force behind its rise to power in the Arabian peninsula, it was fear of being left at the mercy of the Shia mullahs in Tehran that led them to reach out to the Jewish state as a military ally. The ties between Israel and the Saudis have grown since then as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to modernize his nation have moved in tandem with a decision to stop funding Islamist fundamentalists around the globe. That’s an unfortunate practice that has been taken up by Qatar, despite Trump’s embrace of that emirate as a supposed U.S. ally.

But if the Saudis now have fewer reasons to fear Iran, that also means they are bound to be less interested in full peace with Israel.

What the Saudis want

The cost-benefit analysis of normalization of relations with Jerusalem for the Saudis is not as simple as optimists about an expanded Abraham Accords like to pretend. There are real risks for the Saudis to give their seal of approval to Israel as a permanent addition to the Middle East. It goes against the Saudis’ faith and ideology, as well as the prevailing anti-Jewish sentiments of most Muslims and Arabs. That’s true even if many of their governments have come to the logical conclusion that peace with Israel is to the benefit of everyone except the Palestinian Arabs and their supporters, who still cling to fantasies about its annihilation.

The Saudis like their sideline relationship with Israel just fine since it gives them the benefits of a strategic alliance without the cost of undermining its stature as the regime most associated with Muslim legitimacy. The only thing that might tempt them to risk normalization would be if the United States were to give what they requested when Riyadh told the Biden administration in March 2023 what its price for such a move would be.

The Saudis asked for the moon. They not only wanted the United States to formally guarantee their security; they also wanted aid to start their own nuclear program. Neither request is ever likely to be granted, as Congress is unlikely to pass such a treaty, and no conceivable American administration would go along with letting them go nuclear.

Since then, the Saudis have publicly spoken about adding to their wish list by demanding that Israel agree to start a diplomatic process that could lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Riyadh is opposed to such an outcome since another failed Arab state in the regime would likely fall into the hands of Islamist fundamentalists—something not in their interests. But since Oct. 7, greater pressure has been exerted on the Saudis to at least pretend to support the Palestinians.

The administration believes the Saudis may be willing to agree to normalization without granting their extravagant requests. But that brings us back to the first step toward expanding the Abraham Accords: a deal that would end the war in Gaza.

It’s important to remember that the war aims of the Israeli government—the defeat of Hamas and the return of all of the hostages—are still mutually exclusive. As has been obvious since the terrorist invasion of southern Israel, getting all the remaining live hostages back will require Netanyahu to let Hamas survive in Gaza. He has rightly stated that means giving the terrorists the opportunity to rebuild and rearm, and to make good their pledges to commit more assaults like those that occurred on Oct. 7.

The future of Gaza and Israel

Like the wildly unrealistic plans for a state in Judea and Samaria to be given to the Palestinian Authority and its corrupt Fatah leadership, which was embraced by the Biden administration and European nations, the prospect of a withdrawal from Gaza without the eradication of Hamas is inconsistent with any idea of preserving Israeli security.

It’s also inconsistent with Trump’s vision for Gaza’s future, which, whether or not the idea of the coastal enclave being turned into a resort is possible, relies on Hamas being destroyed. That would be true of even far less grandiose schemes. No progress toward peace of any sort is imaginable until the end of the terrorist organization is secured.

That’s something that Trump—and his foreign-policy team—have periodically shown signs of understanding despite promoting ceasefire agreements with the terrorists. It is to be hoped that Trump is prepared to assure Netanyahu that Israel will be free to resume the war against Hamas if its demands for their surrender of Gaza are not met by the time the proposed 60-day halt in the war is concluded. If so, Netanyahu will likely go along with it.

However, if Trump’s appetite for putative peace deals is great enough for him to buy into the idea that there is no point in continuing the fight against Hamas, then Netanyahu will eventually be forced to make a difficult choice.

The president has reason to think Israel owes him a lot for what he has done. But that gratitude cannot take the form of agreeing to measures that are not merely antithetical to its security but the realities of its post-Oct. 7 existence. Netanyahu is loath to say “no” to Trump. Doing so could spoil an essential relationship with an irreplaceable ally, further isolate the Jewish state abroad and put him in a difficult political position at home. No one in Israel wants to find out how Trump, despite his consistent support for Israel, will react to being thwarted when he thinks a deal is on the table.

Friends of Israel have to hope it never comes to that.

Hamas may prove again to be too wedded to its insane dreams of annihilating Israel to agree to the sort of deal Trump might propose. And the president may, despite the expectations of so many of his Jewish detractors and the noises coming from him and the White House about wanting the war to end now, be too sensible ever to go along with something that will let Hamas survive. But if not, it will be up to Netanyahu to hold his ground, however difficult that might be.

Jonathan S. Tobin is editor-in-chief of the Jewish News Syndicate, a senior contributor for The Federalist, a columnist for Newsweek and a contributor to many other publications. He covers the American political scene, foreign policy, the U.S.-Israel relationship, Middle East diplomacy, the Jewish world and the arts. He hosts the JNS “Think Twice” podcast, both the weekly video program and the “Jonathan Tobin Daily” program, which are available on all major audio platforms and YouTube. Previously, he was executive editor, then senior online editor and chief political blogger, for Commentary magazine. Before that, he was editor-in-chief of The Jewish Exponent in Philadelphia and editor of the Connecticut Jewish Ledger. He has won more than 60 awards for commentary, art criticism and other writing. He appears regularly on television, commenting on politics and foreign policy. Born in New York City, he studied history at Columbia University.

Key US Lawmaker Warns Ireland of Potential Economic Consequences for ‘Antisemitic Path’ Against Israel

Corey Walker

US Sen. James Risch (R-ID) speaks during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Washington, DC, May 21, 2024. Photo: Graeme Sloan/Sipa USA via Reuters Connect

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman James Risch (R-ID) issued a sharp warning Tuesday, accusing Ireland of embracing antisemitism and threatening potential economic consequences if the Irish government proceeds with new legislation targeting Israeli trade.

“Ireland, while often a valuable U.S. partner, is on a hateful, antisemitic path that will only lead to self-inflicted economic suffering,” Risch wrote in a post on X. “If this legislation is implemented, America will have to seriously reconsider its deep and ongoing economic ties. We will always stand up to blatant antisemitism.”

Marking a striking escalation in rhetoric from a senior US lawmaker, Risch’s comments came amid growing tensions between Ireland and Israel, which have intensified dramatically since the Hamas-led attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023. Those attacks, in which roughly 1,200 Israelis were killed and more than 200 taken hostage, prompted a months-long Israeli military campaign in Gaza that has drawn widespread international scrutiny. Ireland has positioned itself as one of the most vocal critics of Israel’s response, accusing the Israeli government of disproportionate use of force and calling for immediate humanitarian relief and accountability for the elevated number of Palestinian civilian casualties.

Dublin’s stance has included tangible policy shifts. In May 2024, Ireland formally recognized a Palestinian state, becoming one of the first European Union members to do so following the outbreak of the war in Gaza. The move was condemned by Israeli officials, who recalled their ambassador to Ireland and accused the Irish government of legitimizing terrorism. Since then, Irish lawmakers have proposed further measures, including legislation aimed at restricting imports from Israeli settlements in the West Bank, policies viewed in Israel and among many American lawmakers as aligning with the controversial Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

While Irish leaders have defended their approach as grounded in international law and human rights, critics in Washington, including Risch, have portrayed it as part of a broader pattern of hostility toward Israel. Some US lawmakers have begun raising the possibility of reevaluating trade and diplomatic ties with Ireland in response.

Risch’s warning is one of the clearest indications yet that Ireland’s policies toward Israel could carry economic consequences. The United States is one of Ireland’s largest trading partners, and American companies such as Apple, Google, Meta and Pfizer maintain substantial operations in the country, drawn by Ireland’s favorable tax regime and access to the EU market.

Though the Trump administration has not echoed Risch’s warning, the remarks reflect growing unease in Washington about the trajectory of Ireland’s foreign policy. The State Department has maintained a careful balancing act, expressing strong support for Israel’s security while calling for increased humanitarian access in Gaza. Officials have stopped short of condemning Ireland’s actions directly but have expressed concern about efforts they see as isolating Israel on the international stage.

Ireland’s stance is emblematic of a growing international divide over the war. While the US continues to provide military and diplomatic backing to Israel, many European countries have called for an immediate ceasefire and investigations into alleged war crimes.

Irish public opinion has long leaned pro-Palestinian, and Irish lawmakers have repeatedly voiced concern over the scale of destruction in Gaza and the dire humanitarian situation.

Irish officials have not yet responded to The Algemeiner’s request for comment.